Five or so years ago, Intel rolled out something horrible. Intel’s Management Engine (ME) is a completely separate computing environment running on Intel chipsets that has access to everything. The ME has network access, access to the host operating system, memory, and cryptography engine. The ME can be used remotely even if the PC is powered off. If that sounds scary, it gets even worse: no one knows what the ME is doing, and we can’t even look at the code. When — not ‘if’ — the ME is finally cracked open, every computer running on a recent Intel chip will have a huge security and privacy issue. Intel’s Management Engine is the single most dangerous piece of computer hardware ever created.

Researchers are continuing work on deciphering the inner workings of the ME, and we sincerely hope this Pandora’s Box remains closed. Until then, there’s now a new way to disable Intel’s Management Engine.

Previously, the first iteration of the ME found in GM45 chipsets could be removed. This technique was due to the fact the ME was located on a chip separate from the northbridge. For Core i3/i5/i7 processors, the ME is integrated to the northbridge. Until now, efforts to disable an ME this closely coupled to the CPU have failed.

With a BeagleBone, an SOIC-8 chip clip, and a few breakout wires, this script will run and effectively disable the ME. This exploit has only been confirmed to work on Sandy Bridge and Ivy Bridge processors.

Neutralize ME firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge platforms
http://hardenedlinux.org/firmware/2016/11/17/neutralize_ME_firmware_on_sandybridge_and_ivybridge.html

Researchers built devious, undetectable hardware-level backdoor in computer chips
http://www.computerworld.com/article/3079417/security/researchers-built-devious-undetectable-hardware-level-backdoor-in-computer-chips.html?token=%23tk.CTWNLE_nlt_computerworld_security_2016-06-08&idg_eid=051598d6597df87056c54033166b3242&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Computerworld%20Security%202016-06-08&utm_term=computerworld_security#tk.cw_nlt_computerworld_security_issues_2016-06-08

A2: Analog Malicious Hardware
http://ieee-security.org/TC/SP2016/papers/0824a018.pdf