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	<title>Comments on: A new Petya-like malware hit</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/</link>
	<description>All about electronics and circuit design</description>
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		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1696090</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2020 07:52:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1696090</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[WannaCry: How the Widespread Ransomware Changed Cybersecurity
https://securityintelligence.com/articles/wannacry-worm-ransomware-changed-cybersecurity/
If I had polled cybersecurity experts on their way to work on May 12,
2017, most of them would have said they knew a major cybersecurity
event loomed. Yet, on that day no one expected that they were walking
into the perfect storm in the form of WannaCry ransomware, the most
damaging cyberattack to date when they traveled by car, train or ferry
to their respective offices that spring morning.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>WannaCry: How the Widespread Ransomware Changed Cybersecurity<br />
<a href="https://securityintelligence.com/articles/wannacry-worm-ransomware-changed-cybersecurity/" rel="nofollow">https://securityintelligence.com/articles/wannacry-worm-ransomware-changed-cybersecurity/</a><br />
If I had polled cybersecurity experts on their way to work on May 12,<br />
2017, most of them would have said they knew a major cybersecurity<br />
event loomed. Yet, on that day no one expected that they were walking<br />
into the perfect storm in the form of WannaCry ransomware, the most<br />
damaging cyberattack to date when they traveled by car, train or ferry<br />
to their respective offices that spring morning.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1695169</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2020 07:23:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1695169</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[U.S. Charges Russian Intelligence Officers for NotPetya, Industroyer Attacks
https://www.securityweek.com/us-charges-russian-intelligence-officers-notpetya-industroyer-attacks

The U.S. Department of Justice on Monday announced charges against six Russian intelligence officers for their alleged role in several major cyberattacks conducted over the past years.

The defendants are Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko, aged 32, Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov, 35, Pavel Valeryevich Frolov, 28, Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev, 29, Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko, 27, and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin, 32.

They have all been charged with damaging protected computers, conspiracy to conduct computer fraud and abuse, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>U.S. Charges Russian Intelligence Officers for NotPetya, Industroyer Attacks<br />
<a href="https://www.securityweek.com/us-charges-russian-intelligence-officers-notpetya-industroyer-attacks" rel="nofollow">https://www.securityweek.com/us-charges-russian-intelligence-officers-notpetya-industroyer-attacks</a></p>
<p>The U.S. Department of Justice on Monday announced charges against six Russian intelligence officers for their alleged role in several major cyberattacks conducted over the past years.</p>
<p>The defendants are Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko, aged 32, Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov, 35, Pavel Valeryevich Frolov, 28, Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev, 29, Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko, 27, and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin, 32.</p>
<p>They have all been charged with damaging protected computers, conspiracy to conduct computer fraud and abuse, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1683385</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2020 11:59:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1683385</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[gvnshtn: 	
An inside account of the security practices at Maersk leading up to and after the notPetya malware attack in 2017 and lessons learned from the recovery efforts

Maersk, me &amp; notPetya
https://gvnshtn.com/maersk-me-notpetya/]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>gvnshtn:<br />
An inside account of the security practices at Maersk leading up to and after the notPetya malware attack in 2017 and lessons learned from the recovery efforts</p>
<p>Maersk, me &amp; notPetya<br />
<a href="https://gvnshtn.com/maersk-me-notpetya/" rel="nofollow">https://gvnshtn.com/maersk-me-notpetya/</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1669383</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2020 09:09:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1669383</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[WannaCry ransomware attack on NHS could have triggered NATO reaction,
says German cybergeneral
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/02/03/wannacry_could_have_triggered_nato_german_general_says/
FIC 2020 Western military alliance NATO could have reacted with force
to the 2017 WannaCry ransomware outbreak that locked up half of
Britain&#039;s NHS, Germany&#039;s top cybergeneral has said. During a panel
discussion about military computer security, Major General Juergen
Setzer, the Bundeswehr&#039;s chief information security officer, admitted
that NATO&#039;s secretary-general had floated the idea of a military
response to the software nasty.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>WannaCry ransomware attack on NHS could have triggered NATO reaction,<br />
says German cybergeneral<br />
<a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/02/03/wannacry_could_have_triggered_nato_german_general_says/" rel="nofollow">https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/02/03/wannacry_could_have_triggered_nato_german_general_says/</a><br />
FIC 2020 Western military alliance NATO could have reacted with force<br />
to the 2017 WannaCry ransomware outbreak that locked up half of<br />
Britain&#8217;s NHS, Germany&#8217;s top cybergeneral has said. During a panel<br />
discussion about military computer security, Major General Juergen<br />
Setzer, the Bundeswehr&#8217;s chief information security officer, admitted<br />
that NATO&#8217;s secretary-general had floated the idea of a military<br />
response to the software nasty.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1636916</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:39:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1636916</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ransomware: The key lesson Maersk learned from battling the NotPetya attack
https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-the-key-lesson-maersk-learned-from-battling-the-notpetya-attack/

Protection is important - but it&#039;s equally as important to ensure your recovery process is strong, says head of cybersecurity compliance at the shipping giant.

The extent of the cyberattack was so bad that it just didn&#039;t seem possible that something so destructive could have happened so quickly.

&quot;The severity for me was really taken in when walking through the offices and seeing banks and banks of screens, all black. There was a moment of disbelief, initially, at the sheer ferocity and the speed and scale of the attack and the impact it had.&quot;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ransomware: The key lesson Maersk learned from battling the NotPetya attack<br />
<a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-the-key-lesson-maersk-learned-from-battling-the-notpetya-attack/" rel="nofollow">https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-the-key-lesson-maersk-learned-from-battling-the-notpetya-attack/</a></p>
<p>Protection is important &#8211; but it&#8217;s equally as important to ensure your recovery process is strong, says head of cybersecurity compliance at the shipping giant.</p>
<p>The extent of the cyberattack was so bad that it just didn&#8217;t seem possible that something so destructive could have happened so quickly.</p>
<p>&#8220;The severity for me was really taken in when walking through the offices and seeing banks and banks of screens, all black. There was a moment of disbelief, initially, at the sheer ferocity and the speed and scale of the attack and the impact it had.&#8221;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1634569</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 14:53:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1634569</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[New York Times: 	
Some companies attacked in 2017&#039;s NotPetya ransomware plague have been denied insurance coverage over “war exclusion” clauses

Big Companies Thought Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html

Within days of a cyberattack, warehouses of the snack foods company Mondelez International filled with a backlog of Oreo cookies and Ritz crackers.

Mondelez, owner of dozens of well-known food brands like Cadbury chocolate and Philadelphia cream cheese, was one of the hundreds of companies struck by the so-called NotPetya cyberstrike in 2017. 

Even with teams working around the clock, it was weeks before Mondelez recovered. Once the lost orders were tallied and the computer equipment was replaced, its financial hit was more than $100 million, according to court documents.

After the ordeal, executives at the company took some solace in knowing that insurance would help cover the costs. Or so they thought.

Mondelez’s insurer, Zurich Insurance, said it would not be sending a reimbursement check. It cited a common, but rarely used, clause in insurance contracts: the “war exclusion,” which protects insurers from being saddled with costs related to damage from war.

Mondelez was deemed collateral damage in a cyberwar.

When the United States government assigned responsibility for NotPetya to Russia in 2018, insurers were provided with a justification for refusing to cover the damage. Just as they wouldn’t be liable if a bomb blew up a corporate building during an armed conflict, they claim not to be responsible when a state-backed hack strikes a computer network.

The disputes are playing out in court. 

The legal fights will set a precedent about who pays when businesses are hit by a cyberattack blamed on a foreign government. The cases have broader implications for government officials, who have increasingly taken a bolder approach to naming-and-shaming state sponsors of cyberattacks, but now risk becoming enmeshed in corporate disputes by giving insurance companies a rationale to deny claims.

“You’re running a huge risk that cyberinsurance in the future will be worthless,” 

Cyberattacks have created a unique challenge for insurers. Traditional practices, like not covering multiple buildings in the same neighborhood to avoid the risk of, say, a big fire don’t apply. Malware moves fast and unpredictably, leaving an expensive trail of collateral damage.
NotPetya — which picked up the odd name because security researchers initially confused it with a piece of so-called ransomware called Petya — was a vivid example. It was also a powerful assault on computer networks that incorporated a stolen National Security Agency cyberweapon.

“We still don’t have a clear idea of what cyberwar actually looks like,” said Jake Olcott, vice president at BitSight Technologies, a cyber risk adviser. “That is one of the struggles in this case. No one has said this was an all-out cyberwar by Russia.”

In the past, American officials were reluctant to qualify cyberattacks as cyberwar, fearing the term could provoke an escalation. 

The description of the Sony attack was deliberate

Obama administration had worried, in part, that the use of “cyberwar” would have triggered the liability exclusions and fine print that Mondelez is now challenging in court.

“You have insurers who are sitting on insurance policies that were never underwritten or understood to cover cyber risk,” Mr. Kannry said. “Zurich didn’t underwrite the policy with the idea that a cyber event would cause the kind of losses that happened to Mondelez. Nobody is at war with Mondelez.”

Many insurance companies are rethinking their coverage.

“I don’t want to scare people, but if a country or nation state attacks a very specific segment, like national infrastructure, is that cyberterrorism or is that an act of war?” Ms. Fort asked. “There is still a bit of gray area.”

Collateral damage from attacks that get out of control are going to become more and more common, he added. “That is what cyber is today,” Mr. Sagalow said. “And if you don’t like it, you shouldn’t be in the business.”]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New York Times:<br />
Some companies attacked in 2017&#8242;s NotPetya ransomware plague have been denied insurance coverage over “war exclusion” clauses</p>
<p>Big Companies Thought Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong.<br />
<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html</a></p>
<p>Within days of a cyberattack, warehouses of the snack foods company Mondelez International filled with a backlog of Oreo cookies and Ritz crackers.</p>
<p>Mondelez, owner of dozens of well-known food brands like Cadbury chocolate and Philadelphia cream cheese, was one of the hundreds of companies struck by the so-called NotPetya cyberstrike in 2017. </p>
<p>Even with teams working around the clock, it was weeks before Mondelez recovered. Once the lost orders were tallied and the computer equipment was replaced, its financial hit was more than $100 million, according to court documents.</p>
<p>After the ordeal, executives at the company took some solace in knowing that insurance would help cover the costs. Or so they thought.</p>
<p>Mondelez’s insurer, Zurich Insurance, said it would not be sending a reimbursement check. It cited a common, but rarely used, clause in insurance contracts: the “war exclusion,” which protects insurers from being saddled with costs related to damage from war.</p>
<p>Mondelez was deemed collateral damage in a cyberwar.</p>
<p>When the United States government assigned responsibility for NotPetya to Russia in 2018, insurers were provided with a justification for refusing to cover the damage. Just as they wouldn’t be liable if a bomb blew up a corporate building during an armed conflict, they claim not to be responsible when a state-backed hack strikes a computer network.</p>
<p>The disputes are playing out in court. </p>
<p>The legal fights will set a precedent about who pays when businesses are hit by a cyberattack blamed on a foreign government. The cases have broader implications for government officials, who have increasingly taken a bolder approach to naming-and-shaming state sponsors of cyberattacks, but now risk becoming enmeshed in corporate disputes by giving insurance companies a rationale to deny claims.</p>
<p>“You’re running a huge risk that cyberinsurance in the future will be worthless,” </p>
<p>Cyberattacks have created a unique challenge for insurers. Traditional practices, like not covering multiple buildings in the same neighborhood to avoid the risk of, say, a big fire don’t apply. Malware moves fast and unpredictably, leaving an expensive trail of collateral damage.<br />
NotPetya — which picked up the odd name because security researchers initially confused it with a piece of so-called ransomware called Petya — was a vivid example. It was also a powerful assault on computer networks that incorporated a stolen National Security Agency cyberweapon.</p>
<p>“We still don’t have a clear idea of what cyberwar actually looks like,” said Jake Olcott, vice president at BitSight Technologies, a cyber risk adviser. “That is one of the struggles in this case. No one has said this was an all-out cyberwar by Russia.”</p>
<p>In the past, American officials were reluctant to qualify cyberattacks as cyberwar, fearing the term could provoke an escalation. </p>
<p>The description of the Sony attack was deliberate</p>
<p>Obama administration had worried, in part, that the use of “cyberwar” would have triggered the liability exclusions and fine print that Mondelez is now challenging in court.</p>
<p>“You have insurers who are sitting on insurance policies that were never underwritten or understood to cover cyber risk,” Mr. Kannry said. “Zurich didn’t underwrite the policy with the idea that a cyber event would cause the kind of losses that happened to Mondelez. Nobody is at war with Mondelez.”</p>
<p>Many insurance companies are rethinking their coverage.</p>
<p>“I don’t want to scare people, but if a country or nation state attacks a very specific segment, like national infrastructure, is that cyberterrorism or is that an act of war?” Ms. Fort asked. “There is still a bit of gray area.”</p>
<p>Collateral damage from attacks that get out of control are going to become more and more common, he added. “That is what cyber is today,” Mr. Sagalow said. “And if you don’t like it, you shouldn’t be in the business.”</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1625676</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2019 11:31:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1625676</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Cyberinsurance and Acts of War
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/cyberinsurance_.html

I had not heard about this case before. Zurich Insurance has refused to pay Mondelez International&#039;s claim of $100 million in damages from NotPetya. It claims it is an act of war and therefor not covered. Mondelez is suing.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cyberinsurance and Acts of War<br />
<a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/cyberinsurance_.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/cyberinsurance_.html</a></p>
<p>I had not heard about this case before. Zurich Insurance has refused to pay Mondelez International&#8217;s claim of $100 million in damages from NotPetya. It claims it is an act of war and therefor not covered. Mondelez is suing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1620569</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Jan 2019 10:44:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1620569</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Financial Times:
Mondelez sues insurance company for refusing to pay out $100M claim for NotPetya damages, launching the first major legal battle over cyber attack cost recovery
http://t.co/qpBhJOUjf9]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Financial Times:<br />
Mondelez sues insurance company for refusing to pay out $100M claim for NotPetya damages, launching the first major legal battle over cyber attack cost recovery<br />
<a href="http://t.co/qpBhJOUjf9" rel="nofollow">http://t.co/qpBhJOUjf9</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1619361</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jan 2019 13:24:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1619361</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Cybersecurity and Insurance
https://hackaday.com/2018/12/31/cybersecurity-and-insurance/

Insurance is a funny business. Life insurance, for example, is essentially betting someone you will die before your time. With the recent focus on companies getting hacked, it isn’t surprising that cybersecurity insurance is now big business. Get hacked and get paid. Maybe.

The reason I say maybe is because of the recent court battle between Zurich and Mondelez. Never heard of them? Zurich is a big insurance company and Mondelez owns brands like Nabisco, Oreo, and Trident chewing gum, among others.

It all started with the NotPetya ransomware attack in June of 2017. Mondelez is claiming it lost over $100 million dollars because of the incident. But no problem! They have insurance. If they can get the claim paid by Zurich, that is. Let’s dig in and try to see how this will all shake out.

That’s a Lot of Money

By anyone’s standards, $100 million is a pretty big wad of cash. Apparently, Mondelez uses Windows-based software for shipping and order fulfillment. By adding up property damage (lost hard drives, perhaps), supply and distribution disruption, customer order loss they came up with the $100 million figure.

You might argue if that number is really accurate. 

However, even if you deflated the estimate by an order of magnitude, you are still talking about a $10 million dollar loss. Not small change. Having lived through some major cyberattacks, I can tell you just the time spent in meetings between IT, executives, and lawyers can add up pretty quickly.

Loophole

As you can probably guess, Zurich isn’t wanting to pay the claim. Insurance companies have a reputation for being happier to take your payments than they are paying your claim, and things like this are why. On the other hand, insurance companies have a fiduciary responsibility to their other customers and their shareholders to not pay out any more than they have to, and we get that too. So other than the “We didn’t know you’d ask for $100 million dollars!” defense, how can Zurich not pay if they agreed to underwrite Mondelez against cyberattacks?

Many insurance policies have a clause in them that excludes things like acts of God and acts of war. Well, the technical term is “force majeure” but it covers things like earthquakes and other natural disasters. 

If you have a homeowner’s policy, you probably don’t want a force majeure exclusion.

The act of war is a bit trickier. The logic is the same. If an army marches through your town and burns everything to the ground — or a nuke does the job remotely — the company would be on the hook for so much that they would have to raise premiums quite a bit. In the United States, though, the chances of that seem so slim that no one usually minds. If a nuke hits your house, you probably aren’t going to care anymore anyway.

As usual, though, trying to apply old ideas to new technology causes problems. 

According to media reports, the exact language in the insurance policy covers “hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war” and includes any agent of any government (including a de facto government) or military force. 

The problem is, in a world where the battlefield is the Internet, how does this apply? There is a lot of evidence that NotPetya was state-sponsored by Russia and targeted Ukraine. The fact that it spread globally may even have been a mistake. Russia, of course, denies this.

Lesson Learned

Not being a lawyer or an insurance expert, this whole thing made me think. If you are buying cybersecurity insurance, maybe you don’t want an act of war exclusion. That’s going to drive up costs, but nearly any widespread cyberattack from another country could be argued as an act of war. Especially since in so many cases, these acts are perpetrated by persons unknown. Did the Russians create NotPetya? Did they deploy it? Did they hire some hacker group to do it for them? Does that matter? What if a hacker did it and then says they were paid by some government? How would you ever prove one way or the other?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cybersecurity and Insurance<br />
<a href="https://hackaday.com/2018/12/31/cybersecurity-and-insurance/" rel="nofollow">https://hackaday.com/2018/12/31/cybersecurity-and-insurance/</a></p>
<p>Insurance is a funny business. Life insurance, for example, is essentially betting someone you will die before your time. With the recent focus on companies getting hacked, it isn’t surprising that cybersecurity insurance is now big business. Get hacked and get paid. Maybe.</p>
<p>The reason I say maybe is because of the recent court battle between Zurich and Mondelez. Never heard of them? Zurich is a big insurance company and Mondelez owns brands like Nabisco, Oreo, and Trident chewing gum, among others.</p>
<p>It all started with the NotPetya ransomware attack in June of 2017. Mondelez is claiming it lost over $100 million dollars because of the incident. But no problem! They have insurance. If they can get the claim paid by Zurich, that is. Let’s dig in and try to see how this will all shake out.</p>
<p>That’s a Lot of Money</p>
<p>By anyone’s standards, $100 million is a pretty big wad of cash. Apparently, Mondelez uses Windows-based software for shipping and order fulfillment. By adding up property damage (lost hard drives, perhaps), supply and distribution disruption, customer order loss they came up with the $100 million figure.</p>
<p>You might argue if that number is really accurate. </p>
<p>However, even if you deflated the estimate by an order of magnitude, you are still talking about a $10 million dollar loss. Not small change. Having lived through some major cyberattacks, I can tell you just the time spent in meetings between IT, executives, and lawyers can add up pretty quickly.</p>
<p>Loophole</p>
<p>As you can probably guess, Zurich isn’t wanting to pay the claim. Insurance companies have a reputation for being happier to take your payments than they are paying your claim, and things like this are why. On the other hand, insurance companies have a fiduciary responsibility to their other customers and their shareholders to not pay out any more than they have to, and we get that too. So other than the “We didn’t know you’d ask for $100 million dollars!” defense, how can Zurich not pay if they agreed to underwrite Mondelez against cyberattacks?</p>
<p>Many insurance policies have a clause in them that excludes things like acts of God and acts of war. Well, the technical term is “force majeure” but it covers things like earthquakes and other natural disasters. </p>
<p>If you have a homeowner’s policy, you probably don’t want a force majeure exclusion.</p>
<p>The act of war is a bit trickier. The logic is the same. If an army marches through your town and burns everything to the ground — or a nuke does the job remotely — the company would be on the hook for so much that they would have to raise premiums quite a bit. In the United States, though, the chances of that seem so slim that no one usually minds. If a nuke hits your house, you probably aren’t going to care anymore anyway.</p>
<p>As usual, though, trying to apply old ideas to new technology causes problems. </p>
<p>According to media reports, the exact language in the insurance policy covers “hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war” and includes any agent of any government (including a de facto government) or military force. </p>
<p>The problem is, in a world where the battlefield is the Internet, how does this apply? There is a lot of evidence that NotPetya was state-sponsored by Russia and targeted Ukraine. The fact that it spread globally may even have been a mistake. Russia, of course, denies this.</p>
<p>Lesson Learned</p>
<p>Not being a lawyer or an insurance expert, this whole thing made me think. If you are buying cybersecurity insurance, maybe you don’t want an act of war exclusion. That’s going to drive up costs, but nearly any widespread cyberattack from another country could be argued as an act of war. Especially since in so many cases, these acts are perpetrated by persons unknown. Did the Russians create NotPetya? Did they deploy it? Did they hire some hacker group to do it for them? Does that matter? What if a hacker did it and then says they were paid by some government? How would you ever prove one way or the other?</p>
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		<title>By: Tomi Engdahl</title>
		<link>https://www.epanorama.net/blog/2017/07/02/a-new-petya-like-malware-hit/comment-page-2/#comment-1608037</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tomi Engdahl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 2018 09:50:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.epanorama.net/newepa/?p=57065#comment-1608037</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/

ESET’s analysis of a recent backdoor used by TeleBots – the group behind the massive NotPetya ransomware outbreak – uncovers strong code similarities to the Industroyer main backdoor, revealing a rumored connection that was not previously proven]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya<br />
<a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/" rel="nofollow">https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/</a></p>
<p>ESET’s analysis of a recent backdoor used by TeleBots – the group behind the massive NotPetya ransomware outbreak – uncovers strong code similarities to the Industroyer main backdoor, revealing a rumored connection that was not previously proven</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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