Watch out for well-made (counterfeit) chips. Counterfeit parts are big headache. Saelae tells that they noticed first that many more boards than normal were failing the functional test. The USB chip was running hot. It turned out that every last part was an old revision corresponding to a different (obsolete) part number – the parts had been relabeled with a modern part number.
Counterfeit Electronic Parts presentation from NASA gives examples of counterfeit ICs and information on business around counterfeit electronics.
Counterfeit components can be a a big business and safety risk. Criminal Prosecution – Who can be held liable for the sale of counterfeit parts? is an inside look at the unscrupulous business practices that plague the open market and the liability that could accompany this unethical conduct. This article is intended to serve as a warning to sales, purchasing and management representatives involved in the purchase or sale of integrated circuits in the open market. Ignorance is not a defense. It will likely be difficult, if not impossible, for any representative of the open market to argue that they were “unaware” of the risks.
334 Comments
Tomi Engdahl says:
Interesting article elsewhere:
Chip counterfeiting case exposes defense supply chain flaw
http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4229964/Chip-counterfeiting-case-exposes-defense-supply-chain-flaw?Ecosystem=communications-design
When you type http://www.visiontechcomponents.com into your browser, up pops a cheerful page that tells you, “Sorry! This site is not currently available.”
That’s because last September, the feds shut the component broker down, arrested owner Shannon Wren and administrative manager Stephanie McCloskey, and charged the pair with conspiracy, trafficking in counterfeit goods and mail fraud for knowingly importing more than 3,200 shipments of suspected or confirmed counterfeit semiconductors into the United States, marketing some of the products as “military grade” and selling them to customers that included the U.S. Navy and defense contractors.
The 3,228 shipments that were not seized made their way into the U.S. electronics supply chain through sales VisionTech made to more than 1,100 buyers in virtually every industry sector.
But this story is not about VisionTech. It’s about how the VisionTech case exposed a flaw in the U.S. government’s tactics for catching counterfeit components at the border.
“It’s one of the most perplexing issues I’ve ever dealt with,” said SIA president Brian Toohey. “It’s a national security issue, and a clear and present danger.”
Given that CBP seized just 35 of the 3,263 shipments VisionTech made between 2007 and 2010, the number that CBP could have detained and subsequently released because of a lack of authentication could have been anywhere from zero to 3,228
For manufacturers, it’s essential to have a formal and rigorous process for inspecting and testing suspect components. The components themselves, shipping documentation and packing labels must be inspected as the boxes come off the receiving dock. Suspicious parts should be tested with X-ray inspection systems and high-powered microscopes. Companies should have the chips decapped either mechanically or chemically to check the die markings if they believe it might be warranted. — Bruce Rayner
Tomi Engdahl says:
EDN magazine has an interesting article related to counterfeit electronics:
Advanced security prevents counterfeit products
http://www.edn.com/article/519756-Advanced_security_prevents_counterfeit_products.php
Strategies and technologies are available to help engineers develop and implement security measures to prevent counterfeit products from entering the supply chain.
The effect of counterfeiting is always greater than the value of the counterfeit product itself. By damaging consumers’ perception of the performance, reliability, and safety of branded devices, counterfeiting tarnishes brand image, customer loyalty, and satisfaction.
Furthermore, counterfeits of electronic components and system-level products as well as mechanical products and prescription medications can also affect personal safety and security.
Engineers can use multiple approaches to preventing counterfeit products from functioning in a system and thus prevent potential damage.
Technologies such as holograms and simple RFID transmitters are no longer adequate because counterfeiters keep up to date on the latest copying and code-breaking techniques
One of the main trade-offs of these authentication systems is the cost of protection versus the value of the protected product.
Properly implemented authentication using asymmetric cryptography—the core technology behind digital signatures and certificates—offers the robust protection that can thwart counterfeiters.
However, as the microprocessors available to counterfeiters wanting to hack these systems continue to become faster and cheaper, a key length that seemed adequate a few years ago may no longer offer adequate security, and the currently recommended RSA (Rivest/Shamir/Adleman) key size is 2048 bits. For this reason, effective asymmetric implementations have been too costly for all but the most high-end applications.
Ashraf says:
its good content . thanks
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit components cost more than US dollars, SIA testifies
http://www.edn.com/article/520174-Counterfeit_components_cost_more_than_US_dollars_SIA_testifies.php
US semiconductor companies face more than $7.5 billion in counterfeiting costs each year, but that loss is not the biggest that this illegal practice forces, according to recent Senate testimony by Brian Toohey (photo), president of the SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association). Toohey aims to aid the Senate’s investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the DOD (Department of Defense) supply chain.
“The catastrophic-failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril,” said Toohey, testifying on behalf of the industry before the Senate Armed Services Committee in November. “A counterfeit semiconductor is a ticking time bomb.”
Electronics technologies for 2012 « Tomi Engdahl’s ePanorama blog says:
[...] rise in fake parts is also contributing to engineers’ fears that their products will be corrupted. Counterfeit [...]
Tomi Engdahl says:
Authorized Distribution: Your First Line of Defense Against Counterfeit Parts
http://www2.electronicproducts.com/Authorized_Distribution_Your_First_Line_of_Defense_Against_Counterfeit_Parts-article-edms_CounterfeitParts_Feb2012-html.aspx
Your first line of defense against bogus parts is for you and your company to purchase directly from ECIA and/or CEDA (the China Electronics Distributor Alliance) supplier-authorized distributors, which deliver genuine parts from legitimate manufacturers. In Europe, ECSN, DMASS and FBDI are the supporting organizations.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit chip R&D launched for DoD suppliers
http://www.edn.com/article/520586-Counterfeit_chip_R_D_launched_for_DoD_suppliers.php?cid=NL_Newsletter+-+EDN+Today
The “nanosecurity” R&D effort is to help prevent counterfeiting of computer chips for the $20 billion defense industry chip market.
The College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering has partnered with Applied DNA Sciences on research and further development of APDN’s SigNature DNA product for preventing counterfeiting of computer chips.
The APDN system marks computer chips with DNA codes that can’t be copied, which can then be used to authenticate the originality of chips anywhere along the supply chain.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Russia blames Mars probe failure on space radiation
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/russia-spacecraft-idUSL5E8CV3TU20120131
A burst of space radiation caused the onboard computers to reboot and go into standby mode, he said.
Popovkin said foreign-made counterfeit or defective microchips were partly to blame for the failure of the $165-million spacecraft, designed to retrieve soil samples from the Martian moon Phobos.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Programming Error Doomed Russian Mars Probe
http://science.slashdot.org/story/12/02/07/1838236/programming-error-doomed-russian-mars-probe
“The spacecraft computer failed when two of the chips in the electronics suffered radiation damage. (The Russians say that radiation damage is the most likely cause, but the spacecraft was still in low Earth orbit beneath the radiation belts.) Whatever triggered the chip failure, the ultimate cause was the use of non-space-qualified electronic components. When the chips failed, the on-board computer program crashed.”
We’ve got a contradictory summary here. Chip failure isn’t a programming fault, it’s a hardware problem.
Tomi Engdahl says:
You Wanted What Capacitor Rating?
http://www.designnews.com/author.asp?section_id=1367&doc_id=210491&cid=NL_UBM+Electronics
One engineer told me that recently they had a huge problem with a prototype system, only to discover that a key electronic component was a cheap knock-off. And, worse yet, they bought the part from a reputable distributor, who apparently had been conned themselves!
So much for the theory that buying from sources you know is always safe.
COMMENT:
Aside from the possibility of intentionally sending the wrong parts, it is also possible that the units that measured 300Pf were really 270 Pf devices with 10% tolerance,
So they should have been marked 271 instead of 270. Also likely that somebody found a batch of 270Pf devices marked with the complete value instead of 2 digits and a multiplier. I have run into that and it is a pain. I think that it comes from unknowing purchasing people.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit parts putting military at risk
http://www.edn.com/article/520915-Counterfeit_parts_putting_military_at_risk.php
Counterfeit parts are increasingly finding their way into mission critical military and healthcare equipment, with the number of fake electronic parts soaring dramatically over the past couple of years, according to market research organization IHS iSuppli.
IHS reported a fourfold increase in counterfeit-part incidents worldwide from just 324 in 2009 to 1363 in 2011, after a thorough investigation of OEMs (original equipment manufacturers), contract manufacturers, component suppliers, buyers, and other supply chain participants.
IHS said the increase was just one of the latest developments in “a rapidly escalating global supply chain trend toward increased counterfeiting and piracy of global products,” noting that counterfeit part reports had risen by nearly a factor of 700 over the last decade.
Most of the current counterfeit parts discovered are just cheap substitutes or salvaged waste components that fail to meet strict military and aerospace specifications, said IHS, increasing their risk of potential failure.
Accidental failure aside, there is also a concern that some counterfeit devices like integrated circuits could act as malicious Trojan horses, capable of being disabled remotely to sabotage a mission at a critical junction.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Clamping down on counterfeits
http://www.edn.com/article/520977-Clamping_down_on_counterfeits.php?cid=EDNToday_20120222
New law pushes responsibility and costs for detecting and replacing counterfeit electronics down to defense subcontractors and, potentially, commercial suppliers.
New electronics anti-counterfeiting provisions included in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed into law at the end of last year by President Obama, could reverberate across the electronics supply chain, from defense contractors all the way to commercial OEMs and component suppliers.
“Companies are still assessing what this means, but the scope and scale of application is extremely broad,”
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit Electronic Components: Understanding the Risk
http://www.smtnet.com/library/index.cfm?fuseaction=view_article&article_id=1777
When it comes to assessing the risk related to counterfeit electronic components, you must first assess the percentage of non-OCM (Original Component Manufactured) parts you purchase; this is where the danger
lies. Secondly, if you are purchasing these “brokered parts”, you must decide if field failure returns will endanger lives, tarnish your company’s reputation and cost you significantly in warranty repairs. The third step is to calculate the cost versus the risk.
Marcel Mckisson says:
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Tomi Engdahl says:
GAO Sting Finds More Fake Military Parts From China
http://tech.slashdot.org/story/12/03/29/0038231/gao-sting-finds-more-fake-military-parts-from-china
“The Government Accountability Office, through a fictitious company, recently requisitioned parts from China in order to determine if the Chinese government was living up to its promises of battling counterfeit parts. The report from the GAO found that ’334 of 396 vendors who offered to sell parts to the fictitious company were from China’ and that ‘all 16 parts eventually purchased by the fake company came from 13 China-based vendors and all were determined by an independent testing laboratory to be counterfeit.’ The parts requested were supposedly for use in F-15s, MV-22 Ospreys, and nuclear submarines, and were requested as new parts.
Tomi Engdahl says:
IHS: Counterfeit parts represent $169B annual risk
http://www.edn.com/article/521401-IHS_Counterfeit_parts_represent_169B_annual_risk.php?cid=EDNToday_20120405
The five most prevalent types of semiconductors reported as counterfeits represent $169 billion in potential risk per year for the global electronics supply chain, according to market research firm IHS iSuppli.
The five most commonly counterfeited semiconductor types are analog ICs, microprocessors, memory ICs, programmable logic devices, and transistors, all of which are commonly used in commercial and military applications, according to data provided by IHS. Together, these five component commodity groups accounted for slightly more than two-thirds of all counterfeit incidents reported in 2011, IHS said.
The sum total of the application markets where these five most reported commodity groups are used represented $169 billion worth of semiconductor revenue in 2011,
“There has been a great deal of focus on the issue of counterfeit parts in the defense industry, but the majority of reported counterfeit incidents are for commercial components which have broad use across both military and commercial applications,”
King said that one of every four counterfeit parts reported is an analog IC
“A faulty counterfeit analog IC can cause problems ranging from a mundane dropped phone call to a serious tragedy in the aviation, medical, military, nuclear, or automotive areas,” King said. The excessive cost of rework, repair, and customer returns for component failures is significant, he said. “For the global electronics supply chain, tackling the problem of counterfeit and fraudulent components has become an issue of paramount importance.”
IHS said in February that 2011 was a record year for counterfeit reporting. Incidents of counterfeit parts have tripled during the past two years, according to the firm. Counterfeit parts often are cheap substitutes or salvaged waste components that fail to meet quality requirements, leading to potential failures, IHS said.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Huge amount of counterfeit parts in U.S. military
Counterfeit parts are a great risk to soldiers and U.S. security.
U.S. Senate commissioned a study which examined the amount of counterfeit parts in the armed forces props.
Year-long study revealed 1 800 cases in which a military aircraft had been used with counterfeit electronics inside it.
70 percent of counterfeit goods were traced to China.
After China, the most counterfeited parts arrived from Britain and Canada.
Source: Iltalehti
http://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/2012052215608173_ul.shtml
Tomi Engdahl says:
2011 sets new record for counterfeit electronics
IHS iSuppli says most counterfeits come from Asia, at a rate of one every 15 seconds
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/05/23/counterfeit_asia_supply_chain/
Asian countries led by China are responsible for the vast majority of reports of counterfeit electronics parts, which have reached 12 million over the past five years in a potentially lethal development for the global supply chain, according to analyst IHS iSuppli.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Report reveals fake chips in US military hardware
http://www.edn.com/article/521897-Report_reveals_fake_chips_in_US_military_hardware.php
More than a million suspect counterfeit electronic components have been used in 1,800 separate cases of bogus parts affecting US military hardware, according to a report produced by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The instances affect a number of military airplanes, helicopters, missile, and electronic warfare systems.
“Our report outlines how this flood of counterfeit parts, overwhelmingly from China, threatens national security, the safety of our troops and American jobs,” committee chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich) said, in a statement. “It underscores China’s failure to police the blatant market in counterfeit parts — a failure China should rectify,” he added.
The report concludes that China is responsible for more than 70% of the suspect components. The next two largest sources are the United Kingdom and Canada, although the committee identified instances were both these countries were reselling suspect counterfeit electronic components that originated in China.
The report also concluded that known instances of the use of suspected counterfeit components were not reported promptly to the DoD by contractors.
Tomi Engdahl says:
How the aftermarket and counterfeiting are linked
http://www.edn.com/article/521864-How_the_aftermarket_and_counterfeiting_are_linked.php
The primary source for counterfeit components is factory-made parts that for one reason or another are rejected for sale.
At first glance, it may seem that back-end services, such as collection, recycling, and disposal, have little to do with front-end concerns, such as counterfeit components, but they have more to do with each other than you might think.
Manufacturers with strong partnerships in the aftermarket are more likely to be able to reduce counterfeiting problems with their parts.
To understand why, consider that the primary sources of counterfeit components are factory-made parts that are rejected for sale. They are often cheap substitutes or salvaged waste components that fail to meet quality requirements, leading to potential failures, according to officials at IHS iSuppli.
Because these components contain recyclable materials, such as silicon, or hazardous elements, such as cobalt and lead, component makers outsource the collection and disposal of the parts to third parties that specialize in recycling and reclamation
In some cases, they sell parts destined for scrap to another party that remarks or manipulates a failed part to look new.
The second source of counterfeit parts is PCBs that are also destined for the scrap heap. The boards are diverted and the components are picked off of them, often by hand. The third parties then remark, refurbish, and sell these parts as new.
The electronics industry spends millions of dollars on detection and inspection equipment, trying to spot these parts as they enter the supply chain.
Every sold counterfeit part represents a loss of revenue to distributors or their suppliers. As such, many distributors inspect parts before they enter the warehouse, as they leave the warehouse, and when they return to the warehouse. Suppliers and most OEM customers also conduct incoming and outgoing inspection. The redundancy of these efforts costs the supply channel time and money, yet counterfeit components still get through.
Supply-chain participants in 2011 reported 1363 verified counterfeit-part incidents worldwide, a fourfold increase from 324 in 2009, according to IHS iSuppli.
Distributors are increasingly getting involved in the aftermarket.
They take back used goods, repair them if they can, and dispose of them if they can’t.
As disposal and recycling become more than just good ideas in the electronics industry, selecting the right aftermarket partner is critical.
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Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeiting of semiconductor parts is a growing problem in the industry. All manufacturers of semiconductor products are experiencing counterfeiting of their parts.
Customers who inadvertently purchase counterfeit parts experience many problems such as loss of brand reputation, substandard performance, failed applications, and increased cost of production and manufacturing delays.
Electronics component manufacturers encourage customers to do their part in stopping this practice that is a global problem by buying components direct from manufacturers or from authorized distributors.
Source: http://www.fairchildsemi.com/ds/BS/BS170.pdf
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Tomi Engdahl says:
Questions linger on anti-counterfeit rules
http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/supply-chain-reaction/4390803/Questions-linger-on-anti-counterfeit-rules?cid=Newsletter+-+EDN+Weekly
The US government is expected in September to start issuing regulations to carry out the anti-counterfeiting provision in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. A Senate Armed Services Committee investigation that found more than 1,800 instances of counterfeit electronics in the DOD (Department of Defense) supply chain prompted the provision.
Under the provision’s terms, contractors can’t charge the DOD for remediating problems related to counterfeit parts. The DOD and its contractors must buy electronic components from OCMs (original-component manufacturers), their authorized distributors, or “trusted suppliers” wherever possible, and contractors must establish policies to “eliminate” counterfeit electronic parts from the supply chain.
The provision is unclear regarding responsibility for remedial costs. It doesn’t define what a remedy is or how much responsibility a company must assume for costs.
Nothing in the provision addresses what contractors are supposed to do with counterfeits they discover. The logical decision would be to return them for a refund, but counterfeit parts should not be put back into the supply chain, where they can then be sold to others.
Tomi Engdahl says:
New US rule aims to crack down on Congolese capacitors
Companies must report use of minerals from conflict areas
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/23/sec_conflict_minerals_rule/
In an effort to stem the flow of foreign money into war-torn Africa, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued new rules requiring manufacturers to publicly disclose whether they use minerals extracted from the conflict-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or any neighboring countries.
Specifically, the new SEC rule requires publicly traded companies to investigate and document the sources of any gold, tantalum, tin, or tungsten they import, whenever such materials are “necessary to the functionality or production of a product.”
All four of these elements are frequently used in the manufacture of capacitors, solder, motors, connectors, and other electronic components for mobile phones, DVD players, videogames, computers, and other devices.
Earlier this month, the Enough Project published a list that ranked companies based on their efforts to find out where their minerals come from and to avoid purchasing them from conflict-torn areas.
Now that the final SEC rule has been issued, all manufacturing companies that report their earnings to the SEC will be required to include information about the sources of their materials and whether they believe those sources to be conflict-free. They must also make the same information publicly available on their websites.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Obsolescence mitigation: An approach to a growing problem
http://www.eetimes.com/design/military-aerospace-design/4394971/Obsolescence-mitigation–An-approach-to-a-growing-problem?Ecosystem=communications-design
The obsolescence of all types of electronic components including integrated circuits (ICs) is a serious issue for many OEMs in the military and aerospace communities. Many of the ICs that these OEMs have designed into systems are, unfortunately, becoming obsolete for reasons beyond the control of these companies.
The move to COTS parts proved successful in many applications.
An unintended and unanticipated problem emerged. Many of the new COTS-based systems had originally been designed with the former mil-spec parts which were expected to be available for the long term. In actuality, the COTS parts have finite lifetimes that are substantially shorter than the traditional mil-spec parts. Many OEMs discovered that a COTS part which they designed in had become obsolete long before the program into which the parts were deployed reached its end of life.
A declining supply and steady demand always creates problems.
Actually, before COTS, there was not much of an IC grey market. After the move to COTS parts, a widespread grey market developed to supply older obsolete parts to the unfortunate CMs and OEMs seeking the one critical part needed to complete a build.
Another unintended consequence of the obsolescence of COTS parts is the rise in counterfeit parts.
The grey market
Nonetheless, some companies do use this option.
When purchasing from the grey market, a Mil/Aero OEM must verify part authenticity by making sure that there is an unbroken chain of possession for the parts to verify authenticity. Otherwise, there is the possibility that the parts are counterfeit.
Tomi Engdahl says:
How to mitigate military component supply issues
http://www.eetimes.com/design/military-aerospace-design/4395372/How-to-mitigate-military-component-supply-issues?Ecosystem=communications-design
Designing leading-edge military hardware requires the use of state-of-the-art Integrated Circuit technology to meet system performance targets and yet this work sits sometimes uncomfortably alongside efforts to support and maintain legacy systems that are up to 30 years old. These designs stretch back to the early days of the semiconductor industry when “The Military” drove semiconductor demand and wielded considerable influence. The rapid pace of technological advance and commoditization of ICs together with the associated semiconductor business models have not been easy to manage for the defense industry. So, what lessons can be drawn from the design perspective to minimize future component supply issues.
The defense industry and now other long lifecycle industries are becoming more aware of just how much design resource is consumed, sustaining old products where obsolete components have forced a design change. In acute cases, we have known customers expending up to 40 or 50 percent of design resources on such activities, painfully aware that this valuable effort should be going on new product development.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeiting is a growing problem
http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/other/4395532/Counterfeiting-is-a-growing-problem?cid=EDNToday
Just how big is the semiconductor counterfeiting problem?
Counterfeiting can exist at all stages along the supply chain and according to IHS, 1,363 separate verified counterfeit-part incidents were reported by supply chain participants in 2011, a fourfold increase from 324 in 2009. That means that at least detected incidents are rising faster than the overall growth of the industry.
In fact IHS suggests that the problem has risen by nearly a factor of 700 in the past decade.
So far, most of these problems have been found by U.S.-based military and aerospace electronics firms
How significant can that be? According to an article published by Oneida Research Services “Electrolyte made from a stolen and defective formula found its way into thousands of capacitors used on PC motherboards, causing the components to burst and leak and the computers fail, eventually costing more than $100 million to rectify.”
It wasn’t that long ago that defective batteries found their way into cellphones, which overheated and exploded.
By one estimate between five and twenty percent of all electronic components are counterfeit although there is no data to back up that figure. It also appears that this includes products that are stolen and then sold on the black market or illegally manufactured in excess of quantities from fab lines, or salvaged parts being resold.
The good news is that awareness is increasing
Tomi Engdahl says:
How to spot counterfeit passive components
http://www2.electronicproducts.com/How_to_spot_counterfeit_passive_components-article-facm_cti_oct2012-html.aspx
Visual inspection is one place to start
What is a counterfeit component? The definition has caused much discussion and disagreement in the industry. For the purpose of this article it is defined as any component that is in some way a fake. The faking includes violation of IP, remarking to misrepresent the performance characteristics, the original component manufacturer (OCM), used components rather than new, or OCM lower-grade quality and foreign manufacturer component identified to from a popular, well-known, and respected manufacturer. Many people question why, given the low prices of capacitors and resistors, they would be counterfeited.
What are the sources of counterfeit passive components (this article addresses capacitors and resistors), scrap electronics, lower performance or lower-quality components from the original manufacturer but identified to be higher and more capability of higher-priced components. Passive components are used in much larger quantities on circuit boards than the semiconductor and integrated circuit components.
During the last decade there has been times when tantalum (Ta) capacitors had very long delivery times due to market demand and the prices increased significantly. These capacitors feature different characteristics related to specific applications that may affect reliability.
A well-known manufacturer of tantalum capacitors recently reported remarked counterfeit capacitors with a sophisticated laser marking machine giving the parts the appearance of legitimacy.
Carbon film resistors have been sold as tight tolerance metal film or metal foil resistors with poor resistance tolerance or temperature coefficient. Electrical test and physical dimension measurement are required to detect these counterfeits.
Aluminum electrolytic capacitors have been faked by taking smaller-value caps and inserting into cans the size of the larger rating and marked with the ordered part number
Fake MLCCs can in many cases be detected by comprehensive comparison of physical characteristics to OCM authentic units.
Avoiding and detecting counterfeits
Order only from the OCM or their authorized distributor. This requires advance planning for the typical delivery time specified by supplier. Passive components have a much lower rate in becoming obsolete as compared to integrated circuits, which have an average production life 1.5 to 4 years.
Components purchased from the open market require extensive inspection, comparative analysis and testing to ensure they are authentic. Leaded components, especially the larger ones with markings are easier to authenticate than the surface mount configuration, many of which are too small for markings. These have to be authenticated by the OCM packaging, traceability, physical analysis or electrical testing.
Counterfeit passives represent a real problem for many applications and should be rigorously guarded against. They constitute a reliability hazard, yield loss of assemblies and large scrap or retrofit costs. When there is a legitimate reason (not low prices) to purchase from non-authorized distributors, a comprehensive test and inspection program is necessary to avoid counterfeits.
Tomi says:
Watch A Scary Counterfeit Chinese Airbag Blow Up In Someone’s Face
http://jalopnik.com/5950562/watch-a-scary-counterfeit-chinese-airbag-blow-up-in-someones-face
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration says that 0.1% of the U.S. fleet might be affected, but that’s still tens of thousands of cars. The airbags look like manufacturer-endorsed models, but a Chinese businessman admitted he imported fake airbags that may not work.
If you’ve had the airbag in your vehicle replaced in the last three years and it’s one of the vehicles on this giant list you may be at risk.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit power supply units in the UK
http://www.raspberrypi.org/archives/2151
Everybody testing returned units used in the UK has noted a problem out there with some power supplies, all of which appear to be counterfeit Apple chargers. We’ve all compared notes, and we’re all seeing the same thing: some of you are using chargers you’ve bought in good faith which are not the real thing, and which don’t behave like a safety-tested, properly engineered piece of hardware.
We’ve found that there are three specific, different kinds of fake Apple charger popping up and causing trouble in the UK. We know that Trading Standards are already aware of these fake PSUs; apparently raids on suppliers have been carried out, but there are still plenty of them out there. Here’s some video which should help you check that yours is the real thing. If you find that your charger is a fake, take it back to the seller and raise a stink: and most importantly, stop using it immediately. You could damage your Pi or yourself (and anything else you plug into the PSU).
Tomi Engdahl says:
Fake tech gear has infiltrated the U.S. government
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/08/technology/security/counterfeit-tech/index.html
A record number of tech products used by the U.S. military and dozens of other federal agencies are fake. That opens up a myriad of national security risks, from dud missiles to short-circuiting airplane parts to cyberespionage.
Despite laws designed to crack down on counterfeiters, suppliers labeled by the U.S. government as “high risk” are increasing their sales to federal agencies. Their presence in government’s supply chain soared 63% over the past decade, according to a new study released by IHS, a supply chain management consultancy.
Suppliers with the high-risk branding are known to engage in counterfeiting, wire fraud, product tampering and a laundry list of other illicit and illegal behaviors.
The number of fake tech products floating around in the market quadrupled from 2009 to 2011, according to IHS — and they’re sneaking into some high-profile places.
China continues to be the largest source for counterfeit and pirated goods found in the United States, accounting for 62% of the $178 million in products (with an estimated retail value of $1.1 billion) that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency seized last year.
“Counterfeit parts pose an increasing risk to our national security, to the reliability of our weapons systems and to the safety of our men and women in uniform,” Sen. John McCain, a Republican from Arizona, said last year in support of anti-counterfeiting regulations.
The good news is that some government agencies are fighting back.
NASA is widely viewed as having taken a lead in anti-counterfeiting by completely vetting its suppliers, giving each a score to help its procurement officials pick the lowest-risk vendors. The agency also requires suppliers to show proof that they have various government and vendor certifications, and it resurveys its suppliers every three years.
“There’s an enormous amount of risk associated with counterfeit parts, not just to the men and women of our armed services, but for consumers as well,” King said. “Military and aerospace get the majority of attention, but if a counterfeit part were to escape into minivan’s braking system, you’ve got a huge issue on your hands.”
Matt Salerno says:
I will be attending an interview with a nitrile o-ring this week. This is my first interview.
Jose Siddiq says:
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Tomi Engdahl says:
Addressing the Challenge of Counterfeit Parts – SAE International Unveils New Web Portal
http://www.sae.org/servlets/pressRoom?OBJECT_TYPE=PressReleases&PAGE=showRelease&RELEASE_ID=1875
To help combat such counterfeiting, SAE International offers its new “Counterfeit Parts Portal.” The portal is designed as an information clearing house for manufacturers and engineers trying to cope with the counterfeit parts challenge. Building from SAE International’s leadership position, the new portal aggregates news, articles, opinion pieces, blogs, and regulatory and legislative information related to the topic.
Tomi Engdahl says:
SAE Counterfeit Parts Portal
http://counterfeitparts.sae.org/
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Tomi Engdahl says:
Finding and securing hard-to-find parts
http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/supply-chain-reaction/4407863/Finding-and-securing-hard-to-find-parts-
Adding or subtracting a link in the supply chain is never easy. A single substitution of a component, for example, affects other components on the board
The risk of any one thing going wrong between design and production is considerable and is one of the challenges that keep supply-chain managers up at night, according to research conducted by UPS and IDC.
The classic situation is the component that is hard to find or can’t be sourced at the last minute.
The first line of defense in a shortage is the component supplier. In times of scarcity, however, the supplier’s largest customers will be first in line for delivery. In the semiconductor market, no matter how good forecasting is, it takes 16 weeks to manufacture a component.
When all else fails, buyers can go to the open market or through independent channels. They face several issues in the open market, however. Parts that reach the open market may not carry the manufacturer’s warranties unless they are sourced through an authorized channel. Counterfeit parts also enter the channel through open-market deals where bogus parts are mixed in with legitimate components. Authorized channels remain skeptical of the screening procedures.
Tomi Engdahl says:
AS5553, Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria
http://standards.sae.org/as6462/
AS5553, Aerospace Standard; Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.
Tomi Engdahl says:
SAE’s Counterfeit Part Mitigation standards with AS5553: Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, & Disposition at their core, originated in the aerospace industry with SAE being tasked by NASA and the DoD for solutions to this growing problem. Yet, SAE AS5553 and its related standards are for any market—from mobility to medical—where failure of electronic parts is not an option.
Source: http://app.engineering.sae.org/e/es.aspx?s=1857&e=14528&elq=084a597ed6d743b6bb566b5443a24328
Tomi Engdahl says:
Obsolescence, counterfeiting and COTS: Understanding the consequences
http://www.eetimes.com/design/military-aerospace-design/4410180/Obsolescence–counterfeiting-and-COTS–Understanding-the-consequences
In the last decade, the obsolescence of electronic components including passive components such as resistors, capacitors, inductors as well as integrated circuits (ICs) has become a challenging issue for many OEMs and design houses in the avionics, military and space (AMS) market. Many of the precision resistors and ICs that were designed into systems from the early 90s and into the beginning of the 21st century are, unfortunately, becoming obsolete or difficult to get for reasons beyond the control of these companies.
The reasons can vary. They range from the rejection by specific industries of tin-lead terminations or pressure from purchasing and management to reduce the cost of the bill of materials (BOM), often by searching for substitutes from Asia.
Whatever the specific causes, the results have been quite negative. Many AMS manufacturers have seen unintended consequences in their shift from traditional established-reliability precision resistors qualified by the Defense Electronics Supply Center (also called DSCC) to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) resistors. Pressure to reduce prices has actually hastened obsolescence and counterfeiting while encouraging some suppliers to publish less definitive datasheets that mask the very real differences between their low-priced products and military-qualified devices with full supportive data.
In the 1960s, the start of the exponential growth of electronics in military systems, communication satellites, and space exploration brought about the need for specific base-line performance standards for high-reliability components. Design engineers needed to be certain that components would perform the exact same way with known reliability regardless of manufacturer. That was the only way to be sure that systems operated the same way over different life cycles. It also ensured that replacement parts could be used without changing fundamental performance criteria and with no reduction in reliability.
Beyond standardizing performance, military specifications specified the testing protocols underlying the data used in statistical analysis to define various levels of reliability. Any manufacturer who qualified to these specifications and maintained the continuing testing could supply parts against these specifications. All manufacturers who qualified were considered to be equal.
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Tomi Engdahl says:
The anti-counterfeit movement: Is it really a movement yet?
http://www.edn.com/design/components-and-packaging/4413415/The-anti-counterfeit-movement–Is-it-really-a-movement-yet-
US legislation has compelled a stepped-up interest in preventing counterfeit electronic parts from slipping into the supply chain. It has also raised more questions than it has answered. For many dealing with the enormity of tracking, reporting, and resolving issues associated with potential counterfeit parts, there is a collective hope that 2013 will bring clearer guidance on what needs to be done by whom and when.
the electronic industry’s current dialog on this topic is a good start, but still largely perfunctory. Companies most affected by both the law and customers’ updated risk-management requirements are doing what they can to be legally compliant, but an ongoing weak economic climate and a lack of specific governmental direction raise legitimate questions about whether the cost of an anti-counterfeiting program justifies the business case.
Cost considerations aside, progress depends on how willing industry, government, and academia are to work together to create cost-effective, long-term anti-counterfeiting solutions that outsmart the bad guys, reduce risks, and make the supply chain more secure.
“We have come a long way since these issues first surfaced,” said Kristal Snider, vice president at ERAI Inc, Naples, FL. “But the supply chain cannot mature, improve, and keep up with this issue and develop effective solutions if it’s not something everyone agrees on, at least to some extent.”
“Many of our members have been flushing out their risk-mitigation strategies and are in the process of adopting new standards,” such as IDEAQMS- 9090 and SAE’s AS5553 and AS6081, which address part quality and counterfeit-detection processes
“many independent distributors are making significant capital equipment investments. Some are installing their first X-ray machines; others are looking to buy new equipment with more sophisticated software algorithms that can better detect inconsistencies or process more parts.”
Tomi Engdahl says:
Software supply chain’s soft underbelly
http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/supply-chain-reaction/4414342/Software-supply-chain-s-soft-underbelly
With all the attention on counterfeit electronic components, it’s easy to overlook the vulnerabilities of other supply chains in the computing industry. A recent Gartner report calls attention to the importance of investigating the supply chains of software, services, and even data. The report warns that the “IT supply chain” has become alarmingly insecure.
One example the report cites is the admission in May 2012 by Chinese mobile-phone maker ZTE that one model of its Android phone had a backdoor installed in its software. The backdoor, which was found only in smartphones shipped to the United States, allowed installation of arbitrary applications and full access to any data stored on the phone. There could be other smartphones with similar vulnerabilities, says the report.
To protect against such hacks, corporations need to institute a formal IT supply-chain risk-management program, including investigation into the robustness of software-update mechanisms, says the report. For smartphones, in particular, it recommends asking all hardware and software suppliers for specifics on how they update firmware and software.
The Gartner report notes that just because this happened in a ZTE phone doesn’t necessarily mean that the company had a nefarious motive.
That’s a perfect example of why today’s convoluted IT supply chain is increasingly insecure. The Gartner report says software supply chains can be easy targets because of increased use of outsourced software development. Even if a company uses its own developers, many use thirdparty libraries and frameworks that include open-source software, which can be vulnerable.
Are you doing what you should to ensure the integrity of your software supply chain?
Tomi Engdahl says:
Component obsolescence: Is your process up to the challenge?
http://www.edn.com/design/components-and-packaging/4414186/Component-obsolescence–Is-your-process-up-to-the-challenge-
Electronic component obsolescence presents unique product design challenges such as continuity, quality, cost management, and support for the total life of the product. There are constraints on components and substitutions based on the original board design, customer requirements (e.g., cost, time, functional, environmental requirements), ability to match components for identical drop-in capability versus re-design or interposer modules to resize and allow for drop-in, impact of semiconductor die shrinks on functionality(e.g., noise susceptibility, drive capability, signal integrity, different edge rates, etc.), and supply issues for the immediate and life of the product time frames.
As a result, obsolescence or end of life (EOL) component challenges can prove to be critical events. Importantly, as an engineer, being able to design solutions that enable your products to perform to specifications and environmental requirements without an impact on the product quality, functionality, or otherwise for the customer is a real challenge.
EOL events are not just about component supply though; obviously, the design challenges for maintaining end-products, particularly for board designs, are compounded during EOL events.
EOL events are not just about component supply though; obviously, the design challenges for maintaining end-products, particularly for board designs, are compounded during EOL events.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Key factors determine an independent test laboratory’s credentials
http://www.edn.com/design/test-and-measurement/4415232/Key-factors-determine-an-independent-test-laboratory-s-credentials-
Sustained, significant, global demand for mobile computing devices, particularly tablets and smartphones, is driving an increase in the complexity of chip architectures and the growth of system-in-package (SiP) and system-on-chip (SoC) architectures. With these changes, the need to ensure quality through accredited, best-in-class technical laboratories to conduct functional and anti-counterfeit testing has increased. Understanding how to evaluate such labs and the importance of standards in this type of testing is essential to design engineers, from conceptual phases through bill of materials (BoM) analyses, and ensuring quality sourcing at end-of-life (EOL) events.
Feature demands by users, from consumer electronics to enterprise and industrial sectors, are centered around the advantages gained from increased mobility and data transfer via cloud computing using machine-to-machine (M2M) networks.
As complex chip architectures continue to gain in popularity, the average selling prices (ASPs) will decline and support their commoditization. In the meantime, there is a consolidation of the semiconductor supply chain, in terms of the reduction in the number of fabs and the number of chip manufacturers. Cost has been the main driver in this trend, with macro-economic volatility and reduced consumer and enterprise spending depleting long-term stability from the markets. One of the worrisome outcomes is the reliability of the supply chain given fewer manufacturers who are keeping inventories at very tight and low levels.
Why is the supply chain important for test? Not only is there the business risk of slowdowns or line stoppages due to supply constraints, but there is also a concern for a rise in counterfeiters as a result of supply shortages. During low volume periods (due to shortages, End-of-Life, supply chain disruptions) as well as during high volume events (such as with commoditizing periods with a wave of chips in the market and in demand) counterfeit and fraudulent activity tends to spike. With increasingly complex chips and sophisticated counterfeiters, it is very important to select a good value-added service providers who is industry recognized and accredited testing laboratories with certified quality engineers.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Counterfeit cables force shutdown of two South Korean nuclear power plants
http://www.cablinginstall.com/articles/2013/06/counterfeit-cable-south-korea.html
Multiple media outlets are reporting on a scandal in South Korea in which counterfeit cables had been in use at two of the country’s nuclear power plants since December 2011. Reports indicate the cables, which are power cables and not communications cables, were supplied with bogus safety certificates. Once the forgery was discovered, the two plants in which the cables were used were shut down. Additionally, the reporting states, counterfeit cabling also was found at two reactors currently under construction.
This story by Youkyung Lee of the Associated Press explains the falsified cables “control valves that are responsible for cooling nuclear fuel or preventing the release of radioactive materials during an emergency.” The story points out the cables tested failed 9 of 12 tests related “to their operation in a ‘loss of coolant accident.’”
Tomi says:
Recharging iPhone blamed for another serious shock in China
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57594491-37/recharging-iphone-blamed-for-another-serious-shock-in-china/?part=rss&subj=news&tag=title
An iPhone 4 connected to a counterfeit or third-party charger leaves a 30-year-old man in a coma for the past 10 days, according to reports from Asia.
The report comes on the heels of the death of Ma Ailun, who was allegedly killed when she answered a call on her iPhone while it was reportedly on a third-party charger. The incident, which is still being investigated by both Apple and local authorities, also involved an iPhone 4.
Tomi Engdahl says:
The counterfeiting of well-known brands and products is a growing problem, estimated to be 5% to 7% of world trade, or about $600 billion each year. Counterfeit health and safety products such as electrical and electronic products now occupy second place after pharmaceuticals on the list of those most frequently.
Source: newsletters.cfemedia.com//lt.php?id=f00BUwIMVVICTVMHUQVEAFcKXVEO
Tomi Engdahl says:
Which one is counterfeit?
Identifying phony electrical products can save lives and profits
http://www.controleng.com/single-article/which-one-is-counterfeit/318a11f82622cf3b7c67e5b32bed1237.html
The counterfeiting of well-known brands and products is a growing problem, estimated to be 5% to 7% of world trade, or about $600 billion each year. Counterfeit health and safety products such as electrical and electronic products now occupy second place after pharmaceuticals on the list of those most frequently seized by U.S. Customs.
Counterfeiting has a negative impact on not only companies’ bottom lines and reputations but also public safety. Counterfeit electrical products can overheat or cause short circuits, leading to fires, shocks, or explosions that can cost workers their lives and produce considerable property damage. These illegal products don’t need to comply with performance and safety specifications and they are not tested or approved.
It is important that facility managers understand the dire consequences of using unsafe counterfeit products and know how to avoid them.
By definition, a counterfeit is a product, service, or package for a product that uses, without authorization, the trademark, service mark, or copyright of another intended to deceive prospective customers into believing that the product or service is genuine. This makes detecting the difference between a counterfeit and authentic product difficult.
Some manufacturers and certification organizations also provide tools to verify that electrical products are authentic. This can be an easy way to detect if a product is not certified and therefore should be avoided.
When shopping for electrical products, managers can look for key red flags that signify an item, or distributor, should be avoided. The first red flag is “bargains” that seem too good to be true. Compare the price of that product to a similar product at a different retailer. If it seems too good to be true, the odds are it is.
Scrutinizing labels and packaging can also help identify a counterfeit product, but is just one part of the detection process. As counterfeiters become more sophisticated, a higher level of scrutiny becomes necessary.
Quality control is often lacking in counterfeiting operations, so you may be able to spot a counterfeit simply based on its workmanship.
Finally, if a product is suspected to be counterfeit, it is recommended to contact the original manufacturer. This will allow authentication of the suspect product and ensure that the potentially unsafe product is removed from the marketplace.