https://access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/3031361?sc_cid=7016000000127ECAAY
The SSL/TLS protocol uses RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) primitives for the key exchange algorithm.
RSA is based on the fact that when given a product of two large prime numbers, factorizing the product (which is the public key) is computationally intensive, but a quantum computer could efficiently solve this problem using Shor’s algorithm. Similarly, DH and ECDH key exchanges could all be broken very easily using sufficiently large quantum computers.
For symmetric ciphers, the story is slightly different. It has been proven that applying Grover’s algorithm the strength of symmetric key lengths are effectively halved: AES-256 would have the same security against an attack using Grover’s algorithm that AES-128 has against classical brute-force search. Hashes are also affected in the same way symmetric algorithms are.
Therefore, we need new algorithms which are more resistant to quantum computations. This article introduces you to 5 proposals, which are under study.
303 Comments
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://etn.fi/index.php/13-news/19098-st-tuo-kvanttitason-suojauksen-aelypuhelimiin
STMicroelectronics on esitellyt uuden ST54M-turvasirun, joka on tarkoitettu älypuhelimiin, puettaviin laitteisiin ja muihin henkilökohtaisiin elektroniikkalaitteisiin. Sirun tehtävä on suojata maksamista, digitaalista henkilöllisyyttä, eSIM-yhteyksiä ja muita arjen mobiilipalveluja myös tulevien kvanttitietokoneiden uhkia vastaan.
ST54M ei ole sovellusprosessori eikä modeemi, vaan mobiililaitteen erillinen turvapiiri. Se yhdistää samalle piisirulle NFC-ohjaimen, sulautetun turvaelementin ja eSIM-toiminnot. Näitä käytetään esimerkiksi lähimaksuissa, joukkoliikenteen lipuissa, digitaalisissa avaimissa, kulunvalvonnassa, mobiilivarmenteissa, digitaalisissa ajokorteissa ja operaattoriprofiilien hallinnassa.
Uutta on se, että ST on lisännyt siruun laitteistokiihdyttimen salausalgoritmeille, jotka on suunniteltu kestämään myös kvanttitietokoneiden aikakaudella. Tuettuja algoritmeja ovat ML-KEM ja ML-DSA. Niiden avulla laitevalmistajat voivat alkaa rakentaa puhelimiin ja muihin laitteisiin turvaratkaisuja, joiden pitäisi täyttää 2030-luvulle arvioituja uusia suojausvaatimuksia.
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://www.facebook.com/share/17zPkLnytq/
Jenkeissä on sama aikataulu kuin Suomessa: kriittiset järjestelmät pitäisi päivittää kvanttiturvallisiksi 2030 mennessä.
Itse haluaisin, että sovelluksissa alkaisi jo nyt näkyä varoitus, jos käytössä on vanhanaikainen salausalgoritmi.
Esim. webbisivuilla, pikaviesteissä, ssh:ssa alkaisi näkyä kolmio, jos salaus on vaarassa murtua kvanttialgoritmeillä.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Trump Sets Post-Quantum Security Deadlines as White House Warns of Advanced Cryptographic Threats
https://www.itsecurityguru.org/2026/06/23/trump-sets-post-quantum-security-deadlines-as-white-house-warns-of-advanced-cryptographic-threats/?fbclid=IwdGRjcASqHWRjbGNrBKodDGV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHNydGMGYXBwX2lkDDM1MDY4NTUzMTcyOAABHjOsRAXmVB9uwG5ZPcdAHR2EfrXu40gp0j3xX7Ampz7yW66HwLLyWXMS7kPI_aem_vItjIkXCyS6_FWYHnAkBQg
The White House has unveiled a major new cybersecurity initiative aimed at protecting U.S. government systems and critical infrastructure from the emerging threat posed by quantum computing, setting firm deadlines for the migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC).
President Donald Trump this week signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum and related executive actions designed to accelerate the transition away from traditional cryptographic standards that could eventually be broken by sufficiently powerful quantum computers. The measures establish target dates of 2030 for migrating key establishment and encryption systems, and 2031 for digital signature technologies used across government networks and critical systems.
A Shift from Planning to Action
Industry experts say the significance of the announcement lies not only in the technical requirements but in the introduction of concrete deadlines.
Simon Pamplin, CTO at Certes, said the Executive Order transforms post-quantum security from a future consideration into an immediate operational priority. “This Executive Order confirms what has been treated as a forward-looking concern is now a federal mandate with fixed deadlines. Setting 2030 and 2031 timelines for high value assets removes the ambiguity that has allowed many organisations to treat post-quantum migration as a future problem rather than a present one.”
Pamplin highlighted the White House’s requirement for agencies to appoint dedicated PQC migration leads, arguing that post-quantum readiness is fundamentally an organisational challenge. “What stands out most is the focus on migration as a coordination challenge rather than a simple upgrade. Directing agencies to designate a dedicated PQC migration lead reflects an understanding that this cannot be solved by patching individual systems. Cryptographic dependencies are embedded across hardware, software and communications infrastructure that has often been in place for decades, and untangling that requires sustained organisational effort, not a single technical fix.”
He also pointed to the implications for critical infrastructure operators, saying, “The Order’s emphasis on critical infrastructure is also significant. Power grids, water systems and transportation networks were not built with cryptographic agility in mind. Many run on legacy technology that cannot simply be replaced wholesale. That makes the approach to protection just as important as the timeline.”