Ukraine-Russia cyber war

Ukraine and Russia seems to be at the moments on both traditional and cyber war. We could call that hybrid warfare. We are at a cyber war. Countless examples exist of damage to infrastructure from hostile acts via computer attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a hybrid war from the start, a mix of conventional military strategy — traditional “boots on the ground” — and a slightly more unconventional, digital or cyberwar. On the morning of February 22, 2022, the world woke to the news that Russia had moved troops into two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. Russia started to conduct attacks to Ukraine on February 24. Before physical attacks Russia did several cyber attacks towards IT systems in Ukraine.

Here are links to some material on the cyber side of this war:

How the Eastern Europe Conflict Has Polarized Cyberspace
The war between Russia and Ukraine is advancing. People everywhere are deciding who they will support. The same dynamic happens in the cyberspace. Hacktivists, cybercriminals, white hat researchers or even technology companies are picking a clear side, emboldened to act on behalf of their choices. Historically, Russia has had superiority over Ukraine in the cyberspace. And last week, Ukraine was attacked by destructive wiping malware. However, the situation is starting to change, as most of the non-nation cyber state actors are taking the side of Ukraine. To defend itself, the Ukrainian government has created an international IT army of hacktivists.

As war escalates in Europe, it’s ‘shields up’ for the cybersecurity industry
In unprecedented times, even government bureaucracy moves quickly. As a result of the heightened likelihood of cyberthreat from Russian malactor groups, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) — part of the Department of Homeland Security — issued an unprecedented warning recommending that “all organizations — regardless of size — adopt a heightened posture when it comes to cybersecurity and protecting their most critical assets.”

Digital technology and the war in Ukraine
All of us who work at Microsoft are following closely the tragic, unlawful and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. This has become both a kinetic and digital war, with horrifying images from across Ukraine as well as less visible cyberattacks on computer networks and internet-based disinformation campaigns. We are fielding a growing number of inquiries about these aspects and our work, and therefore we are putting in one place a short summary about them in this blog. This includes four areas: protecting Ukraine from cyberattacks; protection from state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; support for humanitarian assistance; and the protection of our employees.. Also:

Ukraine: Cyberwar creates chaos, ‘it won’t win the war’
There have been at least 150 cyberattacks in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. Their effect is mainly psychological, and experts say they won’t decide the war.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a hybrid war from the start, a mix of conventional military strategy — traditional “boots on the ground” — and a slightly more unconventional, digital or cyberwar.
The global technology company Microsoft has said its Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) detected “destructive cyberattacks directed against Ukraine’s digital infrastructure” hours before the first launch of missiles or movement of tanks on February 24.
Those attacks, which Microsoft dubbed FoxBlade, included so-called wipers — malicious software or malware — that make their way inside computer networks and literally wipe the data from all connected devices.
Cybersecurity experts in Germany have said there have been over a hundred cyberattacks, in various forms, since then. But their effect has mainly been psychological.

Why Russia Hasn’t Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine
In the relatively short and rapidly evolving history of cyber conflict, perhaps nothing has been established with greater certainty and more widely accepted than the idea that Russia has significant cyber capabilities and isn’t afraid to use them—especially on Ukraine. In 2015, Russian government hackers breached the Ukrainian power grid, leading to widespread outages. In 2017, Russia deployed the notorious NotPetya malware via Ukrainian accounting software and the virus quickly spread across the globe costing businesses billions of dollars in damage and disruption.
As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine, many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components.
But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict, it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve, ready to deploy if needed. Instead, it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years, in favor of developing less expensive, less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against. For instance, many of the cyberattacks directed at Ukraine in the past month have been relatively basic distributed denial-of-service attacks.
Given Russia’s past willingness to deploy cyberattacks with far-reaching, devastating consequences, it would be a mistake to count out their cyber capabilities just because they have so far proven unimpressive. And it’s all but impossible to prove the absence of cyber weapons in a nation’s arsenal. But the longer the conflict goes on without any signs of sophisticated cyber sabotage, the more plausible it becomes that the once formidable Russian hackers are no longer playing a central role in the country’s military operations.

Crowd-sourced attacks present new risk of crisis escalation
An unpredictable and largely unknown set of actors present a threat to organizations, despite their sometimes unsophisticated techniques.
Customers who are typically focused on top-tier, state-sponsored attacks should remain aware of these highly motivated threat actors, as well. Misattribution of these actors carries the risk of nations escalating an already dangerous conflict in Ukraine. Based on data from our fellow researchers at Cisco Kenna, customers should be most concerned about threat actors exploiting several recently disclosed vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of consistently updating software and related systems.

Russia, Ukraine and the Danger of a Global Cyberwar
On the morning of February 22, 2022, the world woke to the news that Russia had moved troops into two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. At the time of writing, it is not yet a full invasion of Ukraine, but Russia did conduct attacks on February 24, hitting cities with airstrikes and artillery in what was called a “special military operation” by Russian President Vladamir Putin.
Russia has been waging its own cyberwar against Ukraine for many years.
Since the beginning of 2022, however, it seems that Russian cyber activity against Ukraine has increased. This includes evidence that wiper malware has again disrupted some Ukrainian government networks, and attacks from the FSB-linked Gamaredon have targeted around 5,000 entities, including critical infrastructure and government departments. So far, however, there has not been the same scale of disruption as occurred in 2015, 2016 and 2017.
The purpose of such cyber activity is to weaken critical infrastructure, damage government’s ability to respond to any aggression, and to demoralize the population.
The U.S. has been warning the rest of the world against a potential widening scope of Russian cyber activity, and that cyber defenses generally should be tightened.
“Part of the worry,” said Willett, “is that cyberattacks against Ukraine might bleed over, like NotPetya, to affect other countries and cause wider damage unintentionally. There is some concern that the Russians may intentionally do stuff more widely, but that would probably be in retaliation for something that the U.S. or NATO might do.
This raises the whole question of ‘attribution’. The received belief is it is impossible to do accurate cyber attribution. ““It would be a mistake for any one nation to think it could attack another without being known,” said Willett.That is absolutely wrong,” said Willett.
But accidents happen. The two iconic cyberweapons have been Stuxnet and NotPetya. It is assumed that the U.S. developed Stuxnet (although this has never been admitted). NotPetya has been confidently attributed to the Russian government. Both malwares escaped from their assumed targets into the wider world. This was probably accidental – but similar accidents could lead to wider implications during a period of global geopolitical tension.
On the morning of February 24, 2022, Russian troops invaded Ukraine. This was accompanied by a further increase in cyber activity.

Ukraine Digital Army Brews Cyberattacks, Intel and Infowar
Formed in a fury to counter Russia’s blitzkrieg attack, Ukraine’s hundreds-strong volunteer “hacker” corps is much more than a paramilitary cyberattack force in Europe’s first major war of the internet age. It is crucial to information combat and to crowdsourcing intelligence.
Inventions of the volunteer hackers range from software tools that let smartphone and computer owners anywhere participate in distributed denial-of-service attacks on official Russian websites to bots on the Telegram messaging platform that block disinformation, let people report Russian troop locations and offer instructions on assembling Molotov cocktails and basic first aid.
The movement is global, drawing on IT professionals in the Ukrainian diaspora whose handiwork includes web defacements with antiwar messaging and graphic images of death and destruction in the hopes of mobilizing Russians against the invasion.
The cyber volunteers’ effectiveness is difficult to gauge. Russian government websites have been repeatedly knocked offline, if briefly, by the DDoS attacks, but generally weather them with countermeasures.
It’s impossible to say how much of the disruption — including more damaging hacks — is caused by freelancers working independently of but in solidarity with Ukrainian hackers.
A tool called “Liberator” lets anyone in the world with a digital device become part of a DDoS attack network, or botnet. The tool’s programmers code in new targets as priorities change.

Ukraine Cyber Official: We Only Attack Military Targets
A top Ukrainian cybersecurity official said Friday a volunteer army of hundreds of hackers enlisted to fight Russia in cyberspace is attacking only what it deems military targets, prioritizing government services including the financial sector, Kremlin-controlled media and railways.
Victor Zhora, deputy chair of the state special communications service, also said that there had been about 10 hostile hijackings of local government websites in Ukraine to spread false text propaganda saying his government had capitulated. He said most of Ukraine’s telecommunications and internet were fully operational.
Zhora told reporters in a teleconference that presumed Russian hackers continued to try to spread destructive malware in targeted email attacks on Ukrainian officials and — in what he considers a new tactic — trying to infect the devices of individual citizens.

Army of Cyber Hackers Rise Up to Back Ukraine
An army of volunteer hackers is rising up in cyberspace to defend Ukraine, though internet specialists are calling on geeks and other “hacktivists” to stay out of a potentially very dangerous computer war.
According to Livia Tibirna, an analyst at cyber security firm Sekoia, nearly 260,000 people have joined the “IT Army” of volunteer hackers, which was set up at the initiative of Ukraine’s digital minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
The group, which can be accessed via the encrypted messaging service Telegram, has a list of potential targets in Russia, companies and institutions, for the hackers to target.
It’s difficult to judge the effect the cyber-army is having.

Russia Releases List of IPs, Domains Attacking Its Infrastructure with DDoS Attacks
Russia Blocks Access to Facebook Over War
Russia’s state communications watchdog has ordered to completely block access to Facebook in Russia amid the tensions over the war in Ukraine.
The agency, Roskomnadzor, said Friday it decided to cut access to Facebook over its alleged “discrimination” of the Russian media and state information resources. It said the restrictions introduced by Facebook owner Meta on the RT and other state-controlled media violate the Russian law.

Cyberattack Knocks Thousands Offline in Europe
Thousands of internet users across Europe have been thrown offline after what sources said Friday was a likely cyberattack at the beginning of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine.
According to Orange, “nearly 9,000 subscribers” of a satellite internet service provided by its subsidiary Nordnet in France are without internet following a “cyber event” on February 24 at Viasat, a US satellite operator of which it is a client.
Eutelsat, the parent company of the bigblu satellite internet service, also confirmed to AFP on Friday that around one-third of bigblu’s 40,000 subscribers in Europe, in Germany, France, Hungary, Greece, Italy and Poland, were affected by the outage on Viasat.
In the US, Viasat said on Wednesday that a “cyber event” had caused a “partial network outage” for customers “in Ukraine and elsewhere” in Europe who rely on its KA-SAT satellite.
Viasat gave no further details, saying only that “police and state partners” had been notified and were “assisting” with investigations.
General Michel Friedling, head of France’s Space Command said there had been a cyberattack.

Cybercriminals Seek to Profit From Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Dark web threat actors are looking to take advantage of the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, offering network access and databases that could be relevant to those involved in the conflict, according to a new report from Accenture.
Since mid-January, cybercriminals have started to advertise compromised assets relevant to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and they are expected to increase their offering of databases and network access, with potentially crippling effects for the targeted organizations.
Just over a month ago, soon after the destructive WhisperGate attacks on multiple government, IT, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine, threat actors started to advertise on the dark web access to both breached networks and databases that allegedly contained personally identifiable information (PII).
Amid Russian invasion, Ukraine granted formal role with NATO cyber hub
Ukraine was granted the formal role of “contributing participant” to the hub, known as the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), by its 27-member steering committee, the organization announced. “Ukraine’s presence in the Centre will enhance the exchange of cyber expertise, between Ukraine and CCDCOE member nations, ” Col.
Jaak Tarien, the institution’s director, said in a statement.

This Ukrainian cyber firm is offering hackers bounties for taking down Russian sites
In the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, dozens of hacking groups have taken sides in the conflict, launching attacks on various organizations and government institutions. Cyber Unit Technologies, a Kyiv-based cybersecurity startup, has been particularly outspoken on Tuesday, the company started a campaign to reward hackers for taking down Russian websites and pledged an initial $100, 000 to the program.

High Above Ukraine, Satellites Get Embroiled in the War
While the Russian invasion rages on the ground, companies that operate data-collecting satellites find themselves in an awkward position.
Some researchers are worried that the reliance on satellite imagery has given too much power to the companies that control this technology. “There’s companies like Maxar and Planet that are privately owned and they have the final say on whether or not they want to share the information, ” says Anuradha Damale. The role of private companies in conflicts such as Ukraine means commercial satellites could become targets. In the days before Russia invaded, US space officials warned satellite companies that the conflict could extend into space.

CISA Releases Advisory on Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine
CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have released an advisory on destructive malware targeting organizations in Ukraine. The advisory also provides recommendations and strategies to prepare for and respond to destructive malware. Additionally, CISA has created a new Shields Up Technical Guidance webpage that details other malicious cyber activity affecting Ukraine. The webpage includes technical resources from partners to assist organizations against these threats.

US firms should be wary of destructive malware unleashed on Ukraine, FBI and CISA warn – CNNPolitics
EU Activates Cyber Rapid Response Team Amid Ukraine Crisis

Amid rapid escalation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict derived from historical grievances and qualms with Ukraine’s plan to join the military alliance NATO, the world’s network defenders remain on high alert. And on Tuesday, the European Union confirmed that it will activate its elite cybersecurity team to assist Ukrainians if Russian cyberattacks occur.

UK alludes to retaliatory cyber-attacks on Russia
The UK government alluded yesterday that it might launch offensive cyber operations against Russia if the Kremlin attacks UK computer systems after an invasion of Ukraine.

Amazon: Charities, aid orgs in Ukraine attacked with malware
Charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing critical support in Ukraine are targeted in malware attacks aiming to disrupt their operations and relief efforts seeking to assist those affected by Russia’s war. Amazon has detected these attacks while working with the employees of NGOs, charities, and aid organizations, including UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Program, Red Cross, Polska Akcja Humanitarna, and Save the Children.

Ransomware Used as Decoy in Destructive Cyberattacks on Ukraine
Destructive ‘HermeticWiper’ Malware Targets Computers in Ukraine

Just as Russia was preparing to launch an invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian government websites were disrupted by DDoS attacks and cybersecurity firms reported seeing what appeared to be a new piece of malware on hundreds of devices in the country.
The new malware, dubbed “HermeticWiper” by the cybersecurity community, is designed to erase infected Windows devices. The name references a digital certificate used to sign a malware sample — the certificate was issued to a Cyprus-based company called Hermetica Digital.
“At this time, we haven’t seen any legitimate files signed with this certificate. It’s possible that the attackers used a shell company or appropriated a defunct company to issue this digital certificate,” explained endpoint security firm SentinelOne, whose researchers have been analyzing the new malware.
The malware has also been analyzed by researchers at ESET and Symantec. Each of the companies has shared indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with HermeticWiper.
ESET first spotted HermeticWiper on Wednesday afternoon (Ukraine time) and the company said hundreds of computers in Ukraine had been compromised.

HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine
On February 23rd, the threat intelligence community began observing a new wiper malware sample circulating in Ukrainian organizations. Our analysis shows a signed driver is being used to deploy a wiper that targets Windows devices, manipulating the MBR resulting in subsequent boot failure. This blog includes the technical details of the wiper, dubbed HermeticWiper, and includes IOCs to allow organizations to stay protected from this attack. This sample is actively being used against Ukrainian organizations, and this blog will be updated as more information becomes available. Also:

HermeticWiper: A detailed analysis of the destructive malware that targeted Ukraine
The day before the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces on February 24, a new data wiper was unleashed against a number of Ukrainian entities. This malware was given the name “HermeticWiper” based on a stolen digital certificate from a company called Hermetica Digital Ltd. This wiper is remarkable for its ability to bypass Windows security features and gain write access to many low-level data-structures on the disk. In addition, the attackers wanted to fragment files on disk and overwrite them to make recovery almost impossible.

In Ukraine, Online Gig Workers Keep Coding Through the War
Freelancers or gig workers who piece together work on online platforms are a hidden engine of the Ukrainian economyand the world’s. They work as software engineers, project managers, IT technicians, graphic designers, editors, and copywriters. And they work for everyone.
Invading Russian forces have plunged freelancers’ home offices into chaos and uncertainty. Vlad, a video editor in southern Ukraine, says he’s grown accustomed to the air alarm signal, and hiding until it has passed. Now there are battles 30 miles from his home. “But as long as there is water, electricity, and internet, I can work, ” he says.
“Because we all need to live for something, eat

Leaving Russia? Experts Say Wipe Your Phone Before You Go
Russians fleeing President Vladimir Putin’s regime as it cracks down on anti-war sentimentand rumors of martial law grow louderare being advised to wipe their phones, especially of any traces of support for Ukraine. If they don’t, experts say they may face detention. They’re starting by deleting messages on Signal, Telegram or any app that promises security. For those leaving the country, they’re deleting the apps themselves, and urging others to do the same. Russian media has first-hand accounts of lengthy interrogations at the border, along with phone and laptop searches, though Forbes could not corroborate those claims.

Why ICANN Won’t Revoke Russian Internet Domains
The organization says cutting the country off would have “devastating” effects on the global internet system.
Ukraine on Monday asked ICANN to revoke Russian top-level domains such as .ru, .рф, and .su; to “contribute to the revoking for SSL certificates” of those domains; and to shut down DNS root servers in Russia. Fedorov argued that the requested “measures will help users seek for reliable information in alternative domain zones, preventing propaganda and disinformation.”
Ukraine’s request to cut Russia off from core parts of the internet has been rejected by the nonprofit group that oversees the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). CEO Göran Marby of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) said the group must “maintain neutrality and act in support of the global internet.”
“Our mission does not extend to taking punitive actions, issuing sanctions, or restricting access against segments of the internet—regardless of the provocations,” Marby wrote in his response to Ukraine Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

TikTok Was Designed for War
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine plays out online, the platform’s design and algorithm prove ideal for the messiness of war—but a nightmare for the truth.


  1. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Venäjä ja Valko-Venäjä siirtyivät tietotekniikassa kivikaudelle – Taiwan asetti rajaksi 25 megahertsin kellotaajuuden ja myös nastarajoituksen

    Venäjä hyökkäsi Ukrainaan helmikuussa, jonka myötä maata vastaan on asetettu massiivisia pakotteita. Esimerkki pakotteista on piirien vientirajoitukset.

    Piirejä tarvitaan nykypäivänä vähän kaikkialla, ja niitä tarvitsee kipeästi Venäjän sotateollisuuskin. Pakotteiden vuoksi Venäjälle kuitenkin toimitetaan joko enää vain todella surkeita siruja, tai vaihtoehtoisesti niitä ei toimiteta enää lainkaan.

    Taiwanista siruja vielä toimitetaan, mutta ne ovat antiikkista laatua. Tällä hetkellä Venäjä ja Valko-Venäjä saavat piirivalmistuksen mekasta Taiwanista vain maksimissaan 25 megahertsin kellotaajuudella toimivia piirejä, joiden laskentateho saa olla maksimissaan 0,005 TFLOPSia. Se on nykymaailmassa hyvin vähän.

  2. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Venäjän hyökkäys sai tapahtumajärjestäjät varautumaan hybridiuhkiin todennäköisyys ei ole suuri, mutta uhka on mahdollinen
    Tapahtumajärjestäjät ovat entistä kiinnostuneempia tapahtumiin kohdistuvista hybridiuhista. Hybridivaikuttamiseen varautuminen on noussut erityisesti esiin Venäjän aloitettua hyökkäyssodan Ukrainassa.
    Tapahtumateollisuus ry:n varapuheenjohtaja Kalle Marttinen kertoo, että tapahtumajärjestäjille on tarjolla koulutusta hybridivaikuttamisesta ja sen ennaltaehkäisystä.

    Venäjän hyökkäys sai tapahtumajärjestäjät varautumaan hybridiuhkiin – todennäköisyys ei ole suuri, mutta uhka on mahdollinen

    Tapahtumajärjestäjille on tarjolla koulutusta hybridivaikuttamisesta ja sen ennaltaehkäisystä. Varautuminen on tärkeää, vaikkei uhka olisikaan kovin suuri.

    Tapahtumajärjestäjät ovat entistä kiinnostuneempia tapahtumiin kohdistuvista hybridiuhista.

    Hybridivaikuttamiseen varautuminen on noussut erityisesti esiin Venäjän aloitettua hyökkäyssodan Ukrainassa.

    Tapahtumateollisuus ry:n varapuheenjohtaja Kalle Marttinen kertoo, että tapahtumajärjestäjille on tarjolla koulutusta hybridivaikuttamisesta ja sen ennaltaehkäisystä.

    – Aina on varauduttu siihen, että esimerkiksi nettiyhteydet katkeaisivat, mutta hybridiuhkiin varautuminen on noussut pinnalle nyt kevään aikana maailmanpoliittisen tilanteen takia. On järkevää varautua, jotta ollaan valmiimpia, jos jotain tapahtuu.

    Marttinen tietää yhden tapauksen, jossa virtuaalitapahtuman osallistujille oli alettu levittää venäjämielisiä tekstejä.

    Muita vastaavia tapauksia hänen tiedossaan ei Suomessa ole. Maailman mittakaavassa erilaiset vaikuttamisyritykset ovat kuitenkin tavallisempia ja niihin on varauduttu jo pitkään.

    Tietoturvaa ja suunnittelua

    Livetapahtumien järjestäjät ovat aina varautuneet ukkoseen tai rankkasateeseen, mutta nyt varaudutaan myös toisenlaisiin asioihin.

    – Virtuaalitapahtumissa lähetystä yritetään todennäköisesti häiritä tai kaapata. Isoissa massatapahtumissa häirintä voi olla maksuliikenteen häiritsemistä, tai voidaan vaikka laittaa omia viestejä isolle screenille stadionille, Kalle Marttinen kertoo.

    Tärkeintä varautumista on hyvän tietoturvan ylläpito, ja sitä kaikki tekevät nyt normaalia tiukemmin.

    Toinen asia on, että jos jotain käy, pitää pystyä reagoimaan. Jos jalkapallo-ottelun screenille aletaan syöttää viestejä, on tiedettävä, miten homma keskeytetään.

    – On tiedettävä, mistä niin sanotusti töpseli otetaan irti, jos hallintalaitteet on kaapattu.

    Marttinen ei pidä tapahtumiin kohdistuvaa hybridiuhkaa kovin todennäköisenä, muttei myöskään mahdottomana. Hänen mukaansa suomalaiset tapahtumat ovat kuitenkin turvallisia.

    – Ja jos joku vaikka kaappaa näyttötaulun, ovat suomalaiset valveutuneita ja ymmärtävät, mistä on kysymys. Se ei aiheuta muuta turvallisuusuhkaa.

  3. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Jessikka Aro oli vuosia Venäjän infosodan kohteena, mutta selvisi – nyt hän neuvoo, miten itseään voi suojata harmaan ajan vaaroilta

    Suomen Nato-jäsenyyteen liittyvä harmaa aika voi olla osalle raskas koettelemus. Kysyimme kolmelta oman alansa asiantuntijalta, miten resilienssiään eli henkistä sietokykyään kannattaa uudessa tilanteessa suojata.

    – On tuntunut voimattomalta. On ahdistanut ja pelottanut. On tuntunut, että tämä ei lopu koskaan. Tai jos loppuu, loppu on ikävän näköinen minulle.

    Näin kokemuksiaan kuvailee toimittaja ja tietokirjailija Jessikka Aro. Hän tietää, millaista on olla Venäjän ja sen propagandan levittäjien vaikutusyritysten kohteena.

    Noista kokemuksista voi ottaa nyt laajemminkin opiksi.

    Ylelle työskentelevä Aro alkoi tutkia Venäjän harjoittamaa informaatiovaikuttamista, niin sanottua trolliarmeijaa, noin kahdeksan vuotta sitten, vuonna 2014.

    Aro kertoo, että Venäjän mediassa hänen väitettiin olevan “Suomen pahin vainoaja” ja työskentelevän yhteistyössä Yhdysvaltojen, puolustusliitto Naton sekä Baltian maiden tiedustelupalvelujen kanssa.

    Suomalaisilla valeuutissivustoilla häntä maalitettiin jatkuvasti, mikä aiheutti vihaviestien ja uhkausten tulvan.

    Muunkinlaisia seurauksia oli. Jopa jotkut Aron entisistä ystävistä alkoivat uskoa artikkeleita.

    Hän kuvaa kokemaansa tyypilliseksi Venäjän informaatiosodankäynnin muodoksi.

    – Levitetään salaliittoteorioita yhdestä henkilöstä tarpeeksi monta kertaa, ja siten pyritään lakkauttamaan tämän henkilön työ. Minun tapauksessani Venäjän trolleista uutisointi.

    Aro ei lopulta antanut periksi pelottelulle. Eikä muidenkaan suomalaisten kannata antaa, mikäli Venäjän ennakoitua ilkeilyä kohtaa arjessaan, hän sanoo.

    Sillä juuri se on vaikutusyritysten tavoite. Pelon ja ahdistuksen luominen.

    Aikaa on luonnehdittu muun muassa turvallisuuden kannalta epävarmaksi ja Venäjän on arvioitu voivan kohdistaa Suomeen erilaisia hybridi-iskuja.

    Laajamittaiseen huoleen ei kuitenkaan ole syytä, sanoo hybridiuhkiin erikoistuneen Hybridikeskuksen johtaja Teija Tiilikainen. Vaikutusyritykset ovat suomalaisille ennestään tuttu ilmiö, ja se itsessään antaa suojaa.

    – Ei pidä ajatella, että nyt alkaa joku uusi kausi ja nähdään ihmeellisiä asioita, Tiilikainen toteaa.

    – Olemme nähneet viime vuosina erilaisia hybridiuhkaoperaatioita. Monenlaista epätavanomaista vaikuttamista toisen valtion politiikkaan, kansalaisyhteiskuntaan, poliittiseen keskusteluun, kansalaisten luottamukseen valtaapitäviä kohtaan.

    Vaikutusyrityksiä ovat pelkästään sellaisetkin puheet, että jos Suomi liittyy Natoon, siitä seuraa vasta-askelia (siirryt toiseen palveluun).

    Vaikka ilmiö olisikin tuttu, voi epävarmuudessa eläminen koetella ainakin osan resilienssiä (siirryt toiseen palveluun) eli eräänlaista henkistä sietokykyä.

    Sitäkin voi kuitenkin suojata.

    Tärkein neuvo: tiedosta tilanne

    Parasta varautumista harmaassa ajassa on Teija Tiilikaisen mukaan tilannetietoisuus. Se tarkoittaa, että ymmärtää, että vaikutusyrityksiä voi olla nähtävissä kiihtyvissä määrin, ja tiedostaa, minne juuret johtavat.

    – Jos alkaa tulla jotain aivan kummallista informaatiota Suomea ja suomalaisia olosuhteita koskien, kannattaa miettiä kaksi kertaa ennen kuin siihen uskoo.

    Tiilikainen kehottaa varautumaan myös erilaisiin arjen katkoksiin ja häiriötiloihin, mutta ennen kaikkea hän kiinnittäisi huomiota juuri informaatioympäristöön ja sen manipulointiin.

    – Tämä on herkkä ja varsin käyttökelpoinen väline toisen valtion sisäisten olosuhteiden horjuttamiseksi. Kannattaa aina muistaa tilannetietoisuus, lähdekriittisyys ja outojen tietojen alkuperän ja totuusarvon tarkistaminen.

    Tilanteen tiedostaminen auttoi myös vaikutusyritysten kohteeksi henkilökohtaisesti joutunutta Jessikka Aroa.

    – Ymmärsin, että pelon ja ahdistuksen aiheuttaminen on informaatiosodankäynnin arkkitehtien nimenomainen tarkoitus. He haluaisivat ikään kuin kauko-ohjata minua ja saada minut perääntymään omasta ammatistani. Aiheuttaa näitä kielteisiä tunteita.

    Elämme historiallista aikaa – ja se on raskasta

    Osalle uusi yhteiskunnallinen tilanne voi olla raskas koettelemus, vaikka vaikutusyrityksiin osaisikin varautua.

    Tätä mieltä on tutkimusprofessori Anna-Maria Teperi Työterveyslaitokselta. Hänen tutkimusaluettaan ovat inhimilliset tekijät turvallisuudessa, mukaan lukien resilienssi.

    Takana on kaksi poikkeuksellista koronavuotta. Nykytilanne tulee tuon päälle, Teperi summaa.

    – Tässä tapahtuu valtavia liikkeitä. Elämme historiallista aikaa, ja se on mielenkiintoista mutta samalla myös raskasta. Näistä vuosista tullaan kirjoittamaan historiankirjoissa. Olemme todella erikoisessa ajassa, ja kaikenlainen voimavarojen, toimivien puolien ja ratkaisujen etsiminen on tärkeää, jotta jaksamme tämän läpi.

    Epävarmuuden keskellä tutkimusprofessori kannustaa huolehtimaan hyvinvoinnin peruspilareista: levosta, ravinnosta ja liikunnasta sekä palautumisesta.

    Resilienssiä vahvistaa myös se, että kertoo ajatuksistaan ja mahdollisesti huolistaan muille.

  4. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Venäläiset ladanneet miljoonia VPN-yhteyksiä USA:n tukemilla palveluilla halutaan tehdä reikäjuustoa Kremlin informaatiokuplasta, sanoo tutkija
    Yhdysvaltain hallinto on lisännyt tuntuvasti rahoitustaan ainakin kolmelle amerikkalaiselle teknologiayhtiölle, jotka auttavat venäläisiä kiertämään maansa verkkosensuuria VPN-palvelujen avulla.
    Asiasta kertoo uutistoimisto Reuters(siirryt toiseen palveluun).
    VPN-palvelujen kysyntä on kasvanut Venäjällä räjähdysmäisesti sen jälkeen, kun maa hyökkäsi Ukrainaan helmikuun lopussa. Arvioiden mukaan Venäjällä on ladattu hyökkäyksen jälkeen kuusi miljoonaa VPN-palvelua. Alkup.

  5. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Elon Muskin Starlinkistä tuli Ukrainan käsissä mahtava ase “Avain­­teknologioita sodan voittamisessa”
    SpaceX-yhtiön Starlink-satelliittiyhteydet ovat osoittautuneet erittäin tärkeäksi sodan runtelemalle Ukrainalle. Teknologian kanssa työskentelevä Valeri Jakovenko kertoo, miten Ukraina hyödyntää sitä.

  6. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Ei räjähdys vaan poksahdus – venäläinen propaganda antaa ikäville asioille uudet nimet, tällaisia ne ovat
    Kielitieteilijän mukaan mikään yhteiskunta ei ole immuuni kielen tahalliselle vääristelylle. Vladimir Putinin Venäjällä kielenkäyttöä määrittelee pyrkimys palata neuvostoajan käsitteisiin.

  7. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Windows 10 ja Windows 11 katosivat Venäjällä
    WINDOWS 10 ja viime lokakuussa julkaistu Windows 11 -käyttöjärjestelmä eivät ole enää ladattavissa Venäjällä, uutistoimisto Tass kertoi.
    Tilannetta kartoittaa Bleeping Computer -uutispalvelu. Viikonloppuna ilmennyt ongelma tarkoittaa, että yritykset ladata käyttöjärjestelmien asennustyökaluja tai näköistiedostoja (ISO) päättyvät virheilmoitukseen. Kuitenkin jos ihmiset käyttävät vpn-palvelua väärentääkseen sijaintinsa Venäjän ulkopuolelle, Windowsit voi ladata normaalisti. Ei ole selvää, onko kyseessä virhe vai Microsoftin tahallinen päätös. Yhtiö on rajoittanut liiketoimintaansa laajasti Venäjällä maan hyökättyä Ukrainaan helmikuussa, mutta on sanonut jatkavansa olemassa olevia sopimuksiaan venäläisten asiakkaidensa kanssa. Alkup.

  8. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Russia’s APT28 uses fear of nuclear war to spread Follina docs in Ukraine
    In a recent campaign, APT28, an advanced persistent threat actor linked with Russian intelligence, set its sights on Ukraine, targeting users with malware that steals credentials stored in browsers. APT28 (also known as Sofacy and Fancy Bear) is a notorious Russian threat actor that has been active since at least 2004 with its main activity being collecting intelligence for the Russian government. The group is known to have targeted US politicians, and US organizations, including US nuclear facilities. On June 20, 2022, Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence identified a document that had been weaponized with the Follina (CVE-2022-30190) exploit to download and execute a new.Net stealer first reported by Google. The discovery was also made independently by CERT-UA. The maldoc’s filename, Nuclear Terrorism A Very Real Threat.rtf, attempts to get victims to open it by preying on their fears that the invasion of Ukraine will escalate into a nuclear conflict.

  9. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Microsoft: Russia stepped up cyberattacks against Ukraine’s allies
    Microsoft said today that Russian intelligence agencies have stepped up cyberattacks against governments of countries that have allied themselves with Ukraine after Russia’s invasion. “MSTIC has detected Russian network intrusion efforts on 128 targets in 42 countries outside Ukraine, ” said Microsoft’s President and Vice-Chair Brad Smith. “These represent a range of strategic espionage targets likely to be involved in direct or indirect support of Ukraine’s defense, 49 percent of which have been government agencies.”. The vast majority of these attacks are, as expected, primarily focused on obtaining sensitive information from government agencies in countries currently playing crucial roles in NATO’s and the West’s response to Russia’s war.

  10. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Zach Schonfeld / The Hill:
    Microsoft report details Russian cyberattacks across 42 countries beyond Ukraine since the war began, with a 29% success rate and mainly targeting NATO allies — Russia has levied dozens of cyber espionage campaigns in 42 countries since it invaded Ukraine in February, according to a new Microsoft report.

    Russia launched cyber espionage campaigns against Ukraine allies: Microsoft

    Russia has levied dozens of cyber espionage campaigns in 42 countries since it invaded Ukraine in February, according to a new Microsoft report.

    The report says those efforts have targeted entities across six continents and primarily focused on NATO allies and groups supporting Ukraine.

    “The Russian invasion relies in part on a cyber strategy that includes at least three distinct and sometimes coordinated efforts – destructive cyberattacks within Ukraine, network penetration and espionage outside Ukraine and cyber influence operations targeting people around the world,” Microsoft President Brad Smith said in the report. The tech giant previously detailed Russian cyber operations against Ukraine itself during the invasion in April.

    Sixty-three percent of the observed Russian activity in the 42 countries beyond Ukraine targeted NATO members, according to the new report. The United States has been Russia’s top target, but the company also noted a large amount of activity in Poland — which borders Ukraine and has provided significant military and humanitarian assistance to the country — as well as the Baltic states.

    Microsoft also highlighted an increase in targeting against networks in countries such as Finland and Sweden, which have recently applied for NATO membership, and Turkey, which has raised opposition to those bids.

    Nearly half of the observed activity targeted governments, and another 12 percent focused on nongovernmental organization advising Ukraine on foreign policy or those providing humanitarian aid.

    Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War

    The recorded history of every war typically includes an account of the first shots fired and who witnessed them. Each account provides a glimpse not just into the start of a war, but the nature of the era in which people lived.

    Historians who discuss the first shots in America’s Civil War in 1861 typically describe guns, cannons, and sailing ships around a fort near Charleston, South Carolina.

    Events spiraled toward the launch of World War I in 1914 when terrorists in plain view on a city street in Sarajevo used grenades and a pistol to assassinate the archduke of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

    It would take until the Nuremberg war trials to fully understand what happened near the Polish border 25 years later. In 1939, Nazi SS troops dressed in Polish uniforms and staged an attack against a German radio station. Adolf Hitler cited such attacks to justify a blitzkrieg invasion that combined tanks, planes, and troops to overrun Polish cities and civilians.

    Each of these incidents also provides an account of the technology of the time — technology that would play a role in the war that ensued and the lives of the people who lived through it.

    The war in Ukraine follows this pattern. The Russian military poured across the Ukrainian border on February 24, 2022, with a combination of troops, tanks, aircraft, and cruise missiles. But the first shots were in fact fired hours before when the calendar still said February 23. They involved a cyberweapon called “Foxblade” that was launched against computers in Ukraine. Reflecting the technology of our time, those among the first to observe the attack were half a world away, working in the United States in Redmond, Washington.

    As much as anything, this captures the importance of stepping back and taking stock of the first several months of the war in Ukraine, which has been devastating for the country in terms of destruction and loss of life, including innocent civilians.

    While no one can predict how long this war will last, it’s already apparent that it reflects a trend witnessed in other major conflicts over the past two centuries. Countries wage wars using the latest technology, and the wars themselves accelerate technological change. It’s therefore important to continually assess the impact of the war on the development and use of technology.

    The Russian invasion relies in part on a cyber strategy that includes at least three distinct and sometimes coordinated efforts – destructive cyberattacks within Ukraine, network penetration and espionage outside Ukraine, and cyber influence operations targeting people around the world. This report provides an update and analysis on each of these areas and the coordination among them. It also offers ideas about how to better counter these threats in this war and beyond, with new opportunities for governments and the private sector to work better together.

    This report offers five conclusions that come from the war’s first four months:

    First, defense against a military invasion now requires for most countries the ability to disburse and distribute digital operations and data assets across borders and into other countries. Russia not surprisingly targeted Ukraine’s governmental data center in an early cruise missile attack, and other “on premise” servers similarly were vulnerable to attacks by conventional weapons. Russia also targeted its destructive “wiper” attacks at on-premises computer networks. But Ukraine’s government has successfully sustained its civil and military operations by acting quickly to disburse its digital infrastructure into the public cloud, where it has been hosted in data centers across Europe.

    This has involved urgent and extraordinary steps from across the tech sector, including by Microsoft. While the tech sector’s work has been vital, it’s also important to think about the longer-lasting lessons that come from these efforts.

    Second, recent advances in cyber threat intelligence and end-point protection have helped Ukraine withstand a high percentage of destructive Russian cyberattacks. Because cyber activities are invisible to the naked eye, they are more difficult for journalists and even many military analysts to track. Microsoft has seen the Russian military launch multiple waves of destructive cyberattacks against 48 distinct Ukrainian agencies and enterprises. These have sought to penetrate network domains by initially comprising hundreds of computers and then spreading malware designed to destroy the software and data on thousands of others.

    Russian cyber tactics in the war have differed from those deployed in the NotPetya attack against Ukraine in 2017. That attack used “wormable” destructive malware that could jump from one computer domain to another and hence cross borders into other countries. Russia has been careful in 2022 to confine destructive “wiper software” to specific network domains inside Ukraine itself. But the recent and ongoing destructive attacks themselves have been sophisticated and more widespread than many reports recognize. And the Russian army is continuing to adapt these destructive attacks to changing war needs, including by coupling cyberattacks with the use of conventional weapons.

    Third, as a coalition of countries has come together to defend Ukraine, Russian intelligence agencies have stepped up network penetration and espionage activities targeting allied governments outside Ukraine. At Microsoft we’ve detected Russian network intrusion efforts on 128 organizations in 42 countries outside Ukraine. While the United States has been Russia’s number one target, this activity has also prioritized Poland, where much of the logistical delivery of military and humanitarian assistance is being coordinated. Russian activities have also targeted Baltic countries, and during the past two months there has been an increase in similar activity targeting computer networks in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Turkey. We have also seen an increase in similar activity targeting the foreign ministries of other NATO countries.

    Russian targeting has prioritized governments, especially among NATO members. But the list of targets has also included think tanks, humanitarian organizations, IT companies, and energy and other critical infrastructure suppliers. Since the start of the war, the Russian targeting we’ve identified has been successful 29 percent of the time. A quarter of these successful intrusions has led to confirmed exfiltration of an organization’s data, although as explained in the report, this likely understates the degree of Russian success.

    Fourth, in coordination with these other cyber activities, Russian agencies are conducting global cyber-influence operations to support their war efforts. These combine tactics developed by the KGB over several decades with new digital technologies and the internet to give foreign influence operations a broader geographic reach, higher volume, more precise targeting, and greater speed and agility. Unfortunately, with sufficient planning and sophistication, these cyber-influence operations are well positioned to take advantage of the longstanding openness of democratic societies and the public polarization that is characteristic of current times.

    As the war in Ukraine has progressed, Russian agencies are focusing their cyber-influence operations on four distinct audiences. They are targeting the Russian population with the goal of sustaining support for the war effort. They are targeting the Ukrainian population with the goal of undermining confidence in the country’s willingness and ability to withstand Russian attacks. They are targeting American and European populations with the goal of undermining Western unity and deflecting criticism of Russian military war crimes. And they are starting to target populations in nonaligned countries, potentially in part to sustain their support at the United Nations and in other venues.

    Russian cyber-influence operations are building on and are connected to tactics developed for other cyber activities. Like the APT teams that work within Russian intelligence services, Advance Persistent Manipulator (APM) teams associated with Russian government agencies act through social media and digital platforms.

    Finally, the lessons from Ukraine call for a coordinated and comprehensive strategy to strengthen defenses against the full range of cyber destructive, espionage, and influence operations. As the war in Ukraine illustrates, while there are differences among these threats, the Russian Government does not pursue them as separate efforts and we should not put them in separate analytical silos. In addition, defensive strategies must consider the coordination of these cyber operations with kinetic military operations, as witnessed in Ukraine.

    New advances to thwart these cyber threats are needed, and they will depend on four common tenets and — at least at a high level — a common strategy. The first defensive tenet should recognize that Russian cyber threats are being advanced by a common set of actors inside and outside the Russian Government and rely on similar digital tactics. As a result, advances in digital technology, AI, and data will be needed to counter them. Reflecting this, a second tenet should recognize that unlike the traditional threats of the past, cyber responses must rely on greater public and private collaboration. A third tenet should embrace the need for close and common multilateral collaboration among governments to protect open and democratic societies. And a fourth and final defensive tenet should uphold free expression and avoid censorship in democratic societies, even as new steps are needed to address the full range of cyber threats that include cyber influence operations.

    An effective response must build on these tenets with four strategic pillars. These should increase collective capabilities to better (1) detect, (2) defend against, (3) disrupt, and (4) deter foreign cyber threats. This approach is already reflected in many collective efforts to address destructive cyberattacks and cyber-based espionage. They also apply to the critical and ongoing work needed to address ransomware attacks. We now need a similar and comprehensive approach with new capabilities and defenses to combat Russian cyber influence operations. 

  11. Tomi Engdahl says:

    David Ignatius / Washington Post:
    How a quiet partnership between Microsoft, Google, US and NATO intelligence agencies, and Ukrainian hackers helped foil Russia’s internet hacking operations

    How Russia’s vaunted cyber capabilities were frustrated in Ukraine

    A quiet partnership of the world’s biggest technology companies, U.S. and NATO intelligence agencies, and Ukraine’s own nimble army of hackers has pulled off one of the surprises of the war with Russia, largely foiling the Kremlin’s brazen internet hacking operations.

    Russia’s cyber-reversals haven’t resulted from lack of trying. Microsoft counts nearly 40 Russian destructive attacks between Feb. 23 and April 8, and Rob Joyce, the National Security Agency’s cybersecurity director, said the Russians had attempted an “enormous” cyber offensive. The Russians sabotaged a satellite communications network called Viasat in the opening days of the war, for example, with the damage spilling over into other European countries.

    But Ukraine, working with private tech companies, Western intelligence and its own expert software engineers, has quickly fixed most of the damage. “The Ukrainians have gotten really good at repairing networks,” says Dmitri Alperovitch, a Russian-born cybersecurity expert who co-founded CrowdStrike. “When a network gets wiped, they rebuild it in several hours.”

    The close partnerships that have emerged between U.S. technology companies and Western cybersecurity agencies is one of the unheralded stories of the war. The public-private rift in the tech world that followed Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 appears largely to be over — because of the backlash against Russia’s attacks on the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections and, now, its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

    “Cyber responses must rely on greater public and private collaboration,”

    A White House cyber official explains the new cooperative approach this way: “Where companies see destructive attacks, that has driven partnerships with the intelligence community and other government agencies to see how best we can share information to protect infrastructure around the world.”

    The tech world’s sympathies lie with the underdog, Ukraine. That applies to giant firms such as Microsoft and Google. It even extends to a Ukrainian hacker inside the Russian ransomware gang known as “Conti,” who leaked a “massive” amount of source code and other malware information, according to the White House official.

    Ukraine’s cybersecurity defense benefited from an early start. U.S. Cyber Command experts went to Ukraine months before the war started, according to its commander, Gen. Paul Nakasone. Microsoft and Google became involved even earlier.

    Microsoft began monitoring Russian phishing attacks against Ukrainian military networks in early 2021, and through the rest of last year observed increasingly aggressive hacks by six different attackers linked to Russia’s three intelligence services, the GRU, SVR and FSB, according to a Microsoft report released in April. Microsoft has spent a total of $239 million on financial and technical assistance to Ukraine, a company official said.

    “Microsoft security teams have worked closely with Ukrainian government officials … to identify and remediate threat activity against Ukrainian networks,” the April report noted, adding: “We have kept the U.S. government advised of relevant information and have established communications with NATO and E.U. cyber officials to communicate any evidence of threat actor activity spreading beyond Ukraine.”

    An example of this cooperation came the night before Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, according to the White House cyber official. Microsoft detected a Russian “wiper” software designed to destroy all data on government disks. It quickly developed a patch and also notified the U.S. government, so that the threat warning could be shared as quickly as possible, the official said.

    Google, a part of Alphabet, has also helped Ukraine fend off threats. Back in 2014, prompted by Russia’s use of DDOS (“distributed denial-of-service”) malware in its seizure of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Google began what it called “Project Shield.” Software protected news sites, human rights groups and election sites against crippling DDOS floods of junk internet messages. Today, Project Shield is used by 200 sites in Ukraine and 2,300 others in 140 countries around the world, according to Jared Cohen, the chief executive of Google’s Jigsaw unit.

    Open communications channels are one of the most effective weapons against closed societies such as Russia, and here, again, private companies are playing a key role. Google is sharing software known as “Outline,” which allows Russians and others to create private cloud servers that provide the equivalent of virtual private networks. Elon Musk’s SpaceX has provided satellite internet connections to Ukraine via its “Starlink” network.

    Ukraine’s own internet expertise might be the X-factor. The country was a notorious center for hackers two decades ago, with some of the early credit-card fraudsters (known as “carders”) operating there. That digital savvy has morphed into a powerful part of Ukraine’s defense against Russia. Ukraine also benefits, perversely, from the experience it has gained in eight years of war against Russia and its proxies.

    Here’s a paradoxical benefit of this terrible war: Given Russia’s dependence on Western technology, even for its cyberattacks, Ukraine could backfire on the Kremlin in ways that persist for years. The longer the conflict lasts, the less effective Russia’s vaunted cyber capability will likely become.

  12. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Microsoft: Myös Suomi joutunut Venäjän kyberhyökkäysten kohteeksi
    Teknologiayhtiön tietojen mukaan hyökkäykset eivät ole kohdistuneet pelkästään Ukrainaan.
    Lukuisat hakkerointiyritykset ovat epäonnistuneet, sillä vain 29 prosenttia on päässyt suojauksen läpi.

  13. Tomi Engdahl says:

    ”Kyberspetznaz” hyökkää Liettuaan – laajoja kosto­iskuja verkossa

  14. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War
    The recorded history of every war typically includes an account of the first shots fired and who witnessed them. Each account provides a glimpse not just into the start of a war, but the nature of the era in which people lived.

  15. Tomi Engdahl says:

    ”Kyberspetznaz” hyökkää Liettuaan – laajoja kosto­iskuja verkossa
    Kyberhyökkäyksen taustalla vaikuttavat Liettuan Kaliningradin rautatieliikenteelle asettamat rajoitukset. Todellinen tavoite saattaa olla psykologinen vaikuttaminen.

    Lithuania warns of rise in DDoS attacks against government sites

    NKSC fiksuoja iaugus paslaug trikdymo kibernetini atak skaii Lietuvoje
    Nacionalinis kibernetinio saugumo centras prie Krato apsaugos ministerijos (NKSC) fiksuoja iaugus paskirstyt paslaug trikdymo kibernetini atak (angl. Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS) skaii.

  16. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Kommentti: Texasilaisessa kaasu­laitoksessa räjähti ja nyt asiat menevät juuri kuten Putin haluaa

    Kun onnettomuuksia tapahtuu, syytä haetaan helposti Venäjältä. Juuri tätä hybridivaikuttamisella haetaan, kirjoittaa Ilta-Sanomien digitoimittaja Henrik Kärkkäinen.

    AMERIKKALAISESSA nestemäisen maakaasun eli lng:n tuotantolaitoksessa alkukuusta tapahtuneen räjähdyksen ympärillä on alkanut velloa epäilyksiä venäläisten hakkerien tekemästä iskusta. Kesäkuun 8. päivä Texasin Quintana Islandilla tapahtui tuotantoa rampauttava räjähdys laitoksessa, joka tuottaa noin viidenneksen Yhdysvaltain valmistamasta nestemäisestä kaasusta.

    Vuoden loppuun asti kestävällä tuotantokatkolla uskotaan olevan vaikutuksia kaasun saatavuuteen myös Euroopassa, kirjoitti esimerkiksi The Guardian. Tämä johti kaasun hinnan pomppaamiseen.

    Tuotantolaitoksen omistaja Freeport LNG:n alustavan selvityksen mukaan räjähdyksen syynä oli kaasuputkessa ollut ylipaine ja repeämä. Lausunto on suhteellisen ylimalkainen.

    Explosion at US natural gas plant raises risk of shortages in Europe

    Freeport LNG to shut down for at least three weeks after incident at Texas Gulf coast facility

  17. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Russia-linked actors may be behind an explosion at a liquefied natural gas plant in Texas
    June 26, 2022 By Pierluigi Paganini

    Russian threat actors may be behind the explosion at a liquefied natural gas plant in Texas, the incident took place on June 8.

  18. Tomi Engdahl says:

    8 erilaista kyber­iskua – näin Suomea vastaan voidaan hyökätä

  19. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Russia’s Killnet hacker group says it attacked Lithuania
    Russian hacker group Killnet claimed responsibility on Monday for a DDOS cyber attack on Lithuania, saying it was in response to Vilnius’s decision to block the transit of goods sanctioned by the European Union to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

  20. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Kommentti: Tätäkö halusit, Vladimir Putin? Suomi kutsutaan tänään Natoon – ja se menee myös

    Keskiviikko 29. kesäkuuta jää Suomen tasavallan historiallisten päivien joukkoon, kun Suomi ja Ruotsi kutsutaan Naton jäseneksi, kirjoittaa politiikan erikoistoimittaja Timo Haapala.

  21. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Venäläishakkerit ottivat nyt kohteekseen Norjan – tällainen on Killnet

  22. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Venäläishakkerit ottivat nyt kohteekseen Norjan tällainen on Killnet
    Venäläinen hakkeriryhmä teki keskiviikkona laajan iskun Norjaan.
    Palvelunestohyökkäys kaatoi maan pankkien tunnistautumispalvelu BankID:n sekä Arbeitstilsynetin eli työturvallisuusviraston verkkosivut. Hyökkäyksen kohteeksi joutuivat myös julkishallinnon palveluportaali Altinn, Norjan poliisi sekä norjalaiset lehdet VG, Aftenposten ja Stavanger Aftenblad. Tekijäksi ilmoittautui venäläinen hakkeriryhmä Killnet, joka on tiettävästi usean Ukrainan sotaan liittyvän kyberhyökkäyksen takana. Viestipalvelu Telegramissa ryhmä uhkaili Naton norjalaista pääsihteeriä Jens Stoltenbergiä.

  23. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Ukraine targeted by almost 800 cyberattacks since the war started
    Ukrainian government and private sector organizations have been the target of 796 cyberattacks since the start of the war on February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine. According to Ukraine’s cybersecurity defense and security agency SSSCIP (short for State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection), the country’s networks have been under a constant barrage of hacking attempts since the war started. The country’s government and local authorities, as well as its defense organizations, are the key sectors that have been targeted the most during the first months of the war, in a total of 281 attacks.

  24. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Osat vaihtuivat: USA:n ja EU:n piti pakotteilla musertaa Venäjä, nyt Putin panee vastustajia polvilleen kaasulla ja yhä enemmän vehnällä

    EU:n juhannushuippukokousta suitsutettiin, koska se avasi EU-oven Venäjän moukaroimalle Ukrainalle. Symbolinen päätös on kuitenkin laiha lohtu. Sodan aiheuttamille nopeasti kärjistyville ongelmille unioni ei pystynyt tekemään mitään.

  25. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Entire industries in Germany could collapse due to Russian natural-gas supply cuts: union head

    Entire industries in Germany could collapse due to natural-gas supply cuts from Russia, said Yasmin Fahimi, the country’s top union official.

    “Entire industries are in danger of collapsing permanently because of the gas bottlenecks: aluminum, glass, the chemical industry,” Fahimi, the head of the German Federation of Trade Unions, told Bild am Sonntag. “Such a collapse would have massive consequences for the entire economy and jobs in Germany.”

  26. Tomi Engdahl says:

    Huoltovarmuuskeskuksen johtaja TE:ssä: Ensi talvena kuin energiakriisissä


Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *