Ukraine and Russia seems to be at the moments on both traditional and cyber war. We could call that hybrid warfare. We are at a cyber war. Countless examples exist of damage to infrastructure from hostile acts via computer attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a hybrid war from the start, a mix of conventional military strategy — traditional “boots on the ground” — and a slightly more unconventional, digital or cyberwar. On the morning of February 22, 2022, the world woke to the news that Russia had moved troops into two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. Russia started to conduct attacks to Ukraine on February 24. Before physical attacks Russia did several cyber attacks towards IT systems in Ukraine.
Here are links to some material on the cyber side of this war:
How the Eastern Europe Conflict Has Polarized Cyberspace
https://blog.checkpoint.com/2022/02/27/how-the-eastern-europe-conflict-polarized-cyberspace/
The war between Russia and Ukraine is advancing. People everywhere are deciding who they will support. The same dynamic happens in the cyberspace. Hacktivists, cybercriminals, white hat researchers or even technology companies are picking a clear side, emboldened to act on behalf of their choices. Historically, Russia has had superiority over Ukraine in the cyberspace. And last week, Ukraine was attacked by destructive wiping malware. However, the situation is starting to change, as most of the non-nation cyber state actors are taking the side of Ukraine. To defend itself, the Ukrainian government has created an international IT army of hacktivists.
As war escalates in Europe, it’s ‘shields up’ for the cybersecurity industry
https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/02/as-war-escalates-in-europe-its-shields-up-for-the-cybersecurity-industry/
In unprecedented times, even government bureaucracy moves quickly. As a result of the heightened likelihood of cyberthreat from Russian malactor groups, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) — part of the Department of Homeland Security — issued an unprecedented warning recommending that “all organizations — regardless of size — adopt a heightened posture when it comes to cybersecurity and protecting their most critical assets.”
Digital technology and the war in Ukraine
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/02/28/ukraine-russia-digital-war-cyberattacks/
All of us who work at Microsoft are following closely the tragic, unlawful and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. This has become both a kinetic and digital war, with horrifying images from across Ukraine as well as less visible cyberattacks on computer networks and internet-based disinformation campaigns. We are fielding a growing number of inquiries about these aspects and our work, and therefore we are putting in one place a short summary about them in this blog. This includes four areas: protecting Ukraine from cyberattacks; protection from state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; support for humanitarian assistance; and the protection of our employees.. Also:
https://threatpost.com/microsoft-ukraine-foxblade-trojan-hours-before-russian-invasion/178702/
Ukraine: Cyberwar creates chaos, ‘it won’t win the war’
https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-cyberwar-creates-chaos-it-wont-win-the-war/a-60999197
There have been at least 150 cyberattacks in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. Their effect is mainly psychological, and experts say they won’t decide the war.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a hybrid war from the start, a mix of conventional military strategy — traditional “boots on the ground” — and a slightly more unconventional, digital or cyberwar.
The global technology company Microsoft has said its Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) detected “destructive cyberattacks directed against Ukraine’s digital infrastructure” hours before the first launch of missiles or movement of tanks on February 24.
Those attacks, which Microsoft dubbed FoxBlade, included so-called wipers — malicious software or malware — that make their way inside computer networks and literally wipe the data from all connected devices.
Cybersecurity experts in Germany have said there have been over a hundred cyberattacks, in various forms, since then. But their effect has mainly been psychological.
Why Russia Hasn’t Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine
https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/
In the relatively short and rapidly evolving history of cyber conflict, perhaps nothing has been established with greater certainty and more widely accepted than the idea that Russia has significant cyber capabilities and isn’t afraid to use them—especially on Ukraine. In 2015, Russian government hackers breached the Ukrainian power grid, leading to widespread outages. In 2017, Russia deployed the notorious NotPetya malware via Ukrainian accounting software and the virus quickly spread across the globe costing businesses billions of dollars in damage and disruption.
As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine, many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components.
But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict, it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve, ready to deploy if needed. Instead, it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years, in favor of developing less expensive, less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against. For instance, many of the cyberattacks directed at Ukraine in the past month have been relatively basic distributed denial-of-service attacks.
Given Russia’s past willingness to deploy cyberattacks with far-reaching, devastating consequences, it would be a mistake to count out their cyber capabilities just because they have so far proven unimpressive. And it’s all but impossible to prove the absence of cyber weapons in a nation’s arsenal. But the longer the conflict goes on without any signs of sophisticated cyber sabotage, the more plausible it becomes that the once formidable Russian hackers are no longer playing a central role in the country’s military operations.
Crowd-sourced attacks present new risk of crisis escalation
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/ukraine-update.html
An unpredictable and largely unknown set of actors present a threat to organizations, despite their sometimes unsophisticated techniques.
Customers who are typically focused on top-tier, state-sponsored attacks should remain aware of these highly motivated threat actors, as well. Misattribution of these actors carries the risk of nations escalating an already dangerous conflict in Ukraine. Based on data from our fellow researchers at Cisco Kenna, customers should be most concerned about threat actors exploiting several recently disclosed vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of consistently updating software and related systems.
Russia, Ukraine and the Danger of a Global Cyberwar
https://www.securityweek.com/russia-ukraine-and-danger-global-cyberwar
On the morning of February 22, 2022, the world woke to the news that Russia had moved troops into two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. At the time of writing, it is not yet a full invasion of Ukraine, but Russia did conduct attacks on February 24, hitting cities with airstrikes and artillery in what was called a “special military operation” by Russian President Vladamir Putin.
Russia has been waging its own cyberwar against Ukraine for many years.
Since the beginning of 2022, however, it seems that Russian cyber activity against Ukraine has increased. This includes evidence that wiper malware has again disrupted some Ukrainian government networks, and attacks from the FSB-linked Gamaredon have targeted around 5,000 entities, including critical infrastructure and government departments. So far, however, there has not been the same scale of disruption as occurred in 2015, 2016 and 2017.
The purpose of such cyber activity is to weaken critical infrastructure, damage government’s ability to respond to any aggression, and to demoralize the population.
The U.S. has been warning the rest of the world against a potential widening scope of Russian cyber activity, and that cyber defenses generally should be tightened.
“Part of the worry,” said Willett, “is that cyberattacks against Ukraine might bleed over, like NotPetya, to affect other countries and cause wider damage unintentionally. There is some concern that the Russians may intentionally do stuff more widely, but that would probably be in retaliation for something that the U.S. or NATO might do.
This raises the whole question of ‘attribution’. The received belief is it is impossible to do accurate cyber attribution. ““It would be a mistake for any one nation to think it could attack another without being known,” said Willett.That is absolutely wrong,” said Willett.
But accidents happen. The two iconic cyberweapons have been Stuxnet and NotPetya. It is assumed that the U.S. developed Stuxnet (although this has never been admitted). NotPetya has been confidently attributed to the Russian government. Both malwares escaped from their assumed targets into the wider world. This was probably accidental – but similar accidents could lead to wider implications during a period of global geopolitical tension.
On the morning of February 24, 2022, Russian troops invaded Ukraine. This was accompanied by a further increase in cyber activity.
Ukraine Digital Army Brews Cyberattacks, Intel and Infowar
https://www.securityweek.com/ukraine-digital-army-brews-cyberattacks-intel-and-infowar
Formed in a fury to counter Russia’s blitzkrieg attack, Ukraine’s hundreds-strong volunteer “hacker” corps is much more than a paramilitary cyberattack force in Europe’s first major war of the internet age. It is crucial to information combat and to crowdsourcing intelligence.
Inventions of the volunteer hackers range from software tools that let smartphone and computer owners anywhere participate in distributed denial-of-service attacks on official Russian websites to bots on the Telegram messaging platform that block disinformation, let people report Russian troop locations and offer instructions on assembling Molotov cocktails and basic first aid.
The movement is global, drawing on IT professionals in the Ukrainian diaspora whose handiwork includes web defacements with antiwar messaging and graphic images of death and destruction in the hopes of mobilizing Russians against the invasion.
The cyber volunteers’ effectiveness is difficult to gauge. Russian government websites have been repeatedly knocked offline, if briefly, by the DDoS attacks, but generally weather them with countermeasures.
It’s impossible to say how much of the disruption — including more damaging hacks — is caused by freelancers working independently of but in solidarity with Ukrainian hackers.
A tool called “Liberator” lets anyone in the world with a digital device become part of a DDoS attack network, or botnet. The tool’s programmers code in new targets as priorities change.
Ukraine Cyber Official: We Only Attack Military Targets
https://www.securityweek.com/ukraine-cyber-official-we-only-attack-military-targets
A top Ukrainian cybersecurity official said Friday a volunteer army of hundreds of hackers enlisted to fight Russia in cyberspace is attacking only what it deems military targets, prioritizing government services including the financial sector, Kremlin-controlled media and railways.
Victor Zhora, deputy chair of the state special communications service, also said that there had been about 10 hostile hijackings of local government websites in Ukraine to spread false text propaganda saying his government had capitulated. He said most of Ukraine’s telecommunications and internet were fully operational.
Zhora told reporters in a teleconference that presumed Russian hackers continued to try to spread destructive malware in targeted email attacks on Ukrainian officials and — in what he considers a new tactic — trying to infect the devices of individual citizens.
Army of Cyber Hackers Rise Up to Back Ukraine
https://www.securityweek.com/army-cyber-hackers-rise-back-ukraine
An army of volunteer hackers is rising up in cyberspace to defend Ukraine, though internet specialists are calling on geeks and other “hacktivists” to stay out of a potentially very dangerous computer war.
According to Livia Tibirna, an analyst at cyber security firm Sekoia, nearly 260,000 people have joined the “IT Army” of volunteer hackers, which was set up at the initiative of Ukraine’s digital minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
The group, which can be accessed via the encrypted messaging service Telegram, has a list of potential targets in Russia, companies and institutions, for the hackers to target.
It’s difficult to judge the effect the cyber-army is having.
Russia Releases List of IPs, Domains Attacking Its Infrastructure with DDoS Attacks
https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/russia-releases-list-of-ips-domains.html
Russia Blocks Access to Facebook Over War
https://www.securityweek.com/russia-blocks-access-facebook-over-war
Russia’s state communications watchdog has ordered to completely block access to Facebook in Russia amid the tensions over the war in Ukraine.
The agency, Roskomnadzor, said Friday it decided to cut access to Facebook over its alleged “discrimination” of the Russian media and state information resources. It said the restrictions introduced by Facebook owner Meta on the RT and other state-controlled media violate the Russian law.
Cyberattack Knocks Thousands Offline in Europe
https://www.securityweek.com/cyberattack-knocks-thousands-offline-europe
Thousands of internet users across Europe have been thrown offline after what sources said Friday was a likely cyberattack at the beginning of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine.
According to Orange, “nearly 9,000 subscribers” of a satellite internet service provided by its subsidiary Nordnet in France are without internet following a “cyber event” on February 24 at Viasat, a US satellite operator of which it is a client.
Eutelsat, the parent company of the bigblu satellite internet service, also confirmed to AFP on Friday that around one-third of bigblu’s 40,000 subscribers in Europe, in Germany, France, Hungary, Greece, Italy and Poland, were affected by the outage on Viasat.
In the US, Viasat said on Wednesday that a “cyber event” had caused a “partial network outage” for customers “in Ukraine and elsewhere” in Europe who rely on its KA-SAT satellite.
Viasat gave no further details, saying only that “police and state partners” had been notified and were “assisting” with investigations.
General Michel Friedling, head of France’s Space Command said there had been a cyberattack.
Cybercriminals Seek to Profit From Russia-Ukraine Conflict
https://www.securityweek.com/cybercriminals-seek-profit-russia-ukraine-conflict
Dark web threat actors are looking to take advantage of the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, offering network access and databases that could be relevant to those involved in the conflict, according to a new report from Accenture.
Since mid-January, cybercriminals have started to advertise compromised assets relevant to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and they are expected to increase their offering of databases and network access, with potentially crippling effects for the targeted organizations.
Just over a month ago, soon after the destructive WhisperGate attacks on multiple government, IT, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine, threat actors started to advertise on the dark web access to both breached networks and databases that allegedly contained personally identifiable information (PII).
Amid Russian invasion, Ukraine granted formal role with NATO cyber hub https://therecord.media/amid-russian-invasion-ukraine-granted-formal-role-with-nato-cyber-hub/
Ukraine was granted the formal role of “contributing participant” to the hub, known as the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), by its 27-member steering committee, the organization announced. “Ukraine’s presence in the Centre will enhance the exchange of cyber expertise, between Ukraine and CCDCOE member nations, ” Col.
Jaak Tarien, the institution’s director, said in a statement.
This Ukrainian cyber firm is offering hackers bounties for taking down Russian sites https://therecord.media/this-ukrainian-cyber-firm-is-offering-hackers-bounties-for-taking-down-russian-sites/
In the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, dozens of hacking groups have taken sides in the conflict, launching attacks on various organizations and government institutions. Cyber Unit Technologies, a Kyiv-based cybersecurity startup, has been particularly outspoken on Tuesday, the company started a campaign to reward hackers for taking down Russian websites and pledged an initial $100, 000 to the program.
High Above Ukraine, Satellites Get Embroiled in the War
https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-satellites/
While the Russian invasion rages on the ground, companies that operate data-collecting satellites find themselves in an awkward position.
Some researchers are worried that the reliance on satellite imagery has given too much power to the companies that control this technology. “There’s companies like Maxar and Planet that are privately owned and they have the final say on whether or not they want to share the information, ” says Anuradha Damale. The role of private companies in conflicts such as Ukraine means commercial satellites could become targets. In the days before Russia invaded, US space officials warned satellite companies that the conflict could extend into space.
CISA Releases Advisory on Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/02/26/cisa-releases-advisory-destructive-malware-targeting-organizations
CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have released an advisory on destructive malware targeting organizations in Ukraine. The advisory also provides recommendations and strategies to prepare for and respond to destructive malware. Additionally, CISA has created a new Shields Up Technical Guidance webpage that details other malicious cyber activity affecting Ukraine. The webpage includes technical resources from partners to assist organizations against these threats.
Alert: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a
US firms should be wary of destructive malware unleashed on Ukraine, FBI and CISA warn – CNNPolitics
https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/26/politics/ukraine-malware-warning-cybersecurity-fbi-cisa/index.html
EU Activates Cyber Rapid Response Team Amid Ukraine Crisis
https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/eu-activates-cyber-rapid-response-team-amid-ukraine-crisis-a-18584
Amid rapid escalation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict derived from historical grievances and qualms with Ukraine’s plan to join the military alliance NATO, the world’s network defenders remain on high alert. And on Tuesday, the European Union confirmed that it will activate its elite cybersecurity team to assist Ukrainians if Russian cyberattacks occur.
UK alludes to retaliatory cyber-attacks on Russia
https://therecord.media/uk-alludes-to-retaliatory-cyber-attacks-on-russia/
The UK government alluded yesterday that it might launch offensive cyber operations against Russia if the Kremlin attacks UK computer systems after an invasion of Ukraine.
Amazon: Charities, aid orgs in Ukraine attacked with malware
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazon-charities-aid-orgs-in-ukraine-attacked-with-malware/
Charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing critical support in Ukraine are targeted in malware attacks aiming to disrupt their operations and relief efforts seeking to assist those affected by Russia’s war. Amazon has detected these attacks while working with the employees of NGOs, charities, and aid organizations, including UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Program, Red Cross, Polska Akcja Humanitarna, and Save the Children.
Ransomware Used as Decoy in Destructive Cyberattacks on Ukraine
https://www.securityweek.com/ransomware-used-decoy-destructive-cyberattacks-ukraine
Destructive ‘HermeticWiper’ Malware Targets Computers in Ukraine
https://www.securityweek.com/destructive-hermeticwiper-malware-targets-computers-ukraine
Just as Russia was preparing to launch an invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian government websites were disrupted by DDoS attacks and cybersecurity firms reported seeing what appeared to be a new piece of malware on hundreds of devices in the country.
The new malware, dubbed “HermeticWiper” by the cybersecurity community, is designed to erase infected Windows devices. The name references a digital certificate used to sign a malware sample — the certificate was issued to a Cyprus-based company called Hermetica Digital.
“At this time, we haven’t seen any legitimate files signed with this certificate. It’s possible that the attackers used a shell company or appropriated a defunct company to issue this digital certificate,” explained endpoint security firm SentinelOne, whose researchers have been analyzing the new malware.
The malware has also been analyzed by researchers at ESET and Symantec. Each of the companies has shared indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with HermeticWiper.
ESET first spotted HermeticWiper on Wednesday afternoon (Ukraine time) and the company said hundreds of computers in Ukraine had been compromised.
HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/
On February 23rd, the threat intelligence community began observing a new wiper malware sample circulating in Ukrainian organizations. Our analysis shows a signed driver is being used to deploy a wiper that targets Windows devices, manipulating the MBR resulting in subsequent boot failure. This blog includes the technical details of the wiper, dubbed HermeticWiper, and includes IOCs to allow organizations to stay protected from this attack. This sample is actively being used against Ukrainian organizations, and this blog will be updated as more information becomes available. Also:
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/02/24/hermeticwiper-new-data-wiping-malware-hits-ukraine/
https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-data-wiping-malware-used-in-destructive-attacks-on-ukraine/
HermeticWiper: A detailed analysis of the destructive malware that targeted Ukraine https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/hermeticwiper-a-detailed-analysis-of-the-destructive-malware-that-targeted-ukraine/
The day before the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces on February 24, a new data wiper was unleashed against a number of Ukrainian entities. This malware was given the name “HermeticWiper” based on a stolen digital certificate from a company called Hermetica Digital Ltd. This wiper is remarkable for its ability to bypass Windows security features and gain write access to many low-level data-structures on the disk. In addition, the attackers wanted to fragment files on disk and overwrite them to make recovery almost impossible.
In Ukraine, Online Gig Workers Keep Coding Through the War
https://www.wired.com/story/gig-work-in-ukraine/
Freelancers or gig workers who piece together work on online platforms are a hidden engine of the Ukrainian economyand the world’s. They work as software engineers, project managers, IT technicians, graphic designers, editors, and copywriters. And they work for everyone.
Invading Russian forces have plunged freelancers’ home offices into chaos and uncertainty. Vlad, a video editor in southern Ukraine, says he’s grown accustomed to the air alarm signal, and hiding until it has passed. Now there are battles 30 miles from his home. “But as long as there is water, electricity, and internet, I can work, ” he says.
“Because we all need to live for something, eat
Leaving Russia? Experts Say Wipe Your Phone Before You Go
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/04/russians-escaping-putins-repression-urged-to-wipe-their-phones/
Russians fleeing President Vladimir Putin’s regime as it cracks down on anti-war sentimentand rumors of martial law grow louderare being advised to wipe their phones, especially of any traces of support for Ukraine. If they don’t, experts say they may face detention. They’re starting by deleting messages on Signal, Telegram or any app that promises security. For those leaving the country, they’re deleting the apps themselves, and urging others to do the same. Russian media has first-hand accounts of lengthy interrogations at the border, along with phone and laptop searches, though Forbes could not corroborate those claims.
Why ICANN Won’t Revoke Russian Internet Domains
The organization says cutting the country off would have “devastating” effects on the global internet system.
https://www.wired.com/story/why-icann-wont-revoke-russian-internet-domains/#intcid=_wired-bottom-recirc_8e802014-a05f-48c5-89e8-9dad931361ad_text2vec1-reranked-by-vidi
Ukraine on Monday asked ICANN to revoke Russian top-level domains such as .ru, .рф, and .su; to “contribute to the revoking for SSL certificates” of those domains; and to shut down DNS root servers in Russia. Fedorov argued that the requested “measures will help users seek for reliable information in alternative domain zones, preventing propaganda and disinformation.”
Ukraine’s request to cut Russia off from core parts of the internet has been rejected by the nonprofit group that oversees the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). CEO Göran Marby of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) said the group must “maintain neutrality and act in support of the global internet.”
“Our mission does not extend to taking punitive actions, issuing sanctions, or restricting access against segments of the internet—regardless of the provocations,” Marby wrote in his response to Ukraine Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/marby-to-fedorov-02mar22-en.pdf
TikTok Was Designed for War
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine plays out online, the platform’s design and algorithm prove ideal for the messiness of war—but a nightmare for the truth.
https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-war-tiktok/#intcid=_wired-bottom-recirc_8e802014-a05f-48c5-89e8-9dad931361ad_text2vec1-reranked-by-vidi
2,362 Comments
Tomi Engdahl says:
Ulkoministeriötä vakoilleet FSB-hakkerit iskivät jälleen tällä kertaa sotilaskohteisiin
https://www.tivi.fi/uutiset/tv/7dd6b741-7cfd-4188-b181-24c56cb53d69
Venäjän valtioon kytköksissä olevan hakkeriryhmä Turlan on havaittu ujuttautuneen Itävallan kauppakamarin ja Virossa sijaitsevan Baltian puolustuskorkeakoulun järjestelmiin. Merkkejä Turlan toiminnasta on löytynyt myös Naton verkko-oppimisalustalta, kirjoittaa Bleeping Computer. [Tämä myös jo aikaisemmassa koosteessa]
Tomi Engdahl says:
Pekka Toveri: Ukrainassa voi tapahtua talvisodan toisinto – “Tavoitteita supistetaan koko ajan”
Pekka Toveri uskoo, että ukrainalaiset ovat hyvin perillä joukkojensa tilanteesta.
https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/f0565a3d-068e-4701-aa74-c9f471ac1a3a
Venäjä on Severodonetskista aiheuttanut rintamalinjaan selvän pullistuman ja päässyt etenemään joka suunnassa.
Kenraalimajuri evp. Pekka Toveri ei silti usko, että Ukrainan rintama olisi romahtamassa.
Toveri esittää Ukrainan tilanteen kannalta parhaan ja huonoimman skenaarion.
Ukrainan vastahyökkäykset ovat joutuneet ongelmiin. Venäjän hyökkäystoimet Itä-Ukrainassa ovat mahdollisesti saaneet uutta voimaa, ja puolustajan vastahyökkäykset joutuneet ongelmiin.
Toveri sanookin, ettei peliä ole vielä pelattu.
– On mielenkiintoista nähdä, mitä ukrainalaiset tekevät seuraavaksi. Kuten kadettikoulussakin opetettiin, tilanne ole koskaan niin paha kuin miltä se näyttää, hän sanoo.
Ukrainalainen sotilas Donbassin alueella 12. huhtikuuta.
”Talvisodan toisinto”
Huonoin tilannekuva olisi Toverin mukaan se, ettei Ukraina osaisi antaa periksi ja säästää joukkojaan, vaan venäläisten annettaisiin saartaa Ukrainan joukkoja liian pitkään ja tuhoamaan niitä motteihin.
Toveri sanoo, että tämäkin tilanne on kuin talvisodan toisintoa, jossa Venäjän oli tarkoitus oli vallata koko Suomi ja vaihtaa sen hallinto.
– No, se ei onnistunut, joten heivattiin suunnitelmat ja tyydyttiin vähempään.
Toveri sanoo, että jos Venäjä saisi vallattua esimerkiksi Luhanskin alueen, niin tilanne todennäköisesti markkinoitaisiin niin, että kyseisen alueen valtaaminen oli koko ajan Venäjän ainoa tavoite.
– Ei tietenkään voida myöntää, että lähdettiin alun perin valtaamaan koko Ukrainaa.
Tomi Engdahl says:
What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/19/politics/us-weapons-ukraine-intelligence/index.html
The US has few ways to track the substantial supply of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and other weaponry it has sent across the border into Ukraine, sources tell CNN, a blind spot that’s due in large part to the lack of US boots on the ground in the country — and the easy portability of many of the smaller systems now pouring across the border.
It’s a conscious risk the Biden administration is willing to take.
In the short term, the US sees the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment to be vital to the Ukrainians’ ability to hold off Moscow’s invasion.
“We have fidelity for a short time, but when it enters the fog of war, we have almost zero,” said one source briefed on US intelligence. “It drops into a big black hole, and you have almost no sense of it at all after a short period of time.”
Tomi Engdahl says:
Spy agency pumps billions into orbital imagery companies BlackSky, Maxar and Planet
https://techcrunch.com/2022/05/25/spy-agency-pumps-billions-into-orbital-imagery-companies-blacksky-maxar-and-planet/?tpcc=tcplusfacebook
CEO Brian O’Toole recently told me “The world is going to be awash with sensors — it’s a massive market that’s massively fragmented. So we started building the software platform that integrates all that using AI and machine learning.” That bet seemingly has paid off, and O’Toole noted today that BlackSky has been tapped to provide imagery for the Ukraine conflict, where hourly scale intelligence has proved invaluable.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Tietoturva-asiantuntija: Pidätys Venäjällä oli varoitus USA:lle tulevasta Ukrainan sodasta https://www.is.fi/digitoday/tietoturva/art-2000008842354.html
Venäjä teki runsas kuukausi ennen hyökkäystään jotain ennenkuulumatonta: pidätti valtion suojeluksessa olleen rikollisjengin. Kyseessä oli viesti amerikkalaisille, sanoo tietoturva-asiantuntija.
VENÄJÄN tammikuussa tekemä isku REvil-verkkorikollisliigaa vastaan oli Venäjän lähettämä viesti Yhdysvalloille ja rivien väliin kehotettu kehotus olla puuttumatta Ukrainan sotaan, sanoo ruotsalainen tietoturva-asiantuntija, TrueSec-tietoturvayhtiön perustaja Marcus Murray. Murray puhui HP:n Reinvent-tilaisuudessa Helsingissä tiistaina.
Murrayn mukaan Yhdysvaltain tiedustelupalveluilla oli selkeä käsitys Venäjän hyökkäyksestä hyvissä ajoin. Iskemällä REvil-kiristäjäjengiä vastaan USA:n pyynnöstä Venäjä lähetti amerikkalaisille viestin.
– Heidän sanomansa oli: jos pysytte poissa Ukrainasta, kiristysongelmanne katoaa ainakin osittain.
Venäläistaustainen REvil on yksi internetin pahamaineisimmista kiristäjäjengeistä.
Samaan aikaan Venäjä esitti korkean tason vaatimuksen siitä, että Nato ei laajenisi itään. Murrayn mukaan kyse oli otsikkotasolla käydystä neuvottelusta USA:n ja Venäjän välillä.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Venäjällä irtisanotaan ukrainalaisia it-osaajia yritykset pelkäävät “sabotaasia”
https://www.tivi.fi/uutiset/tv/a98b3871-cc80-4536-90aa-8aded94f5682
Venäjän digitaalisen kehityksen ministeriö varoittaa it-yrityksiä irtisanomasta ukrainalaisia työntekijöitään. Ministeriön mukaan Ukrainan kansalaisia irtisanovien yritysten virallinen asema poistetaan ja niiden saamat etuudet lakkautetaan. Hyökkäyssodan Ukrainaan aloittanutta Venäjää vaivaa kova pula it-osaajista. Tuhannet ammattilaiset jättivät maan helmikuussa alkaneen sodan mukaan.
Venäläisen uutissivusto Lentan mukaan maassa oli 21. maaliskuuta 95
000 avointa it-alan työpaikkaa.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Salaperäinen hakkeriryhmä iskee Venäjää vastaan https://www.is.fi/digitoday/tietoturva/art-2000008845368.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
An unknown APT group is targeting Russian government entities since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/131658/apt/unknown-apt-group-target-russia.html
Researchers from Malwarebytes observed an unknown Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group targeting Russian government entities with at least four separate spear-phishing campaigns since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Suosittu vpn-palvelu lakkasi yllättäen toimimasta Venäjällä https://www.tivi.fi/uutiset/tv/e3409ca7-086a-4224-919c-5d30192bd82a
Windscriben mukaan yhtiö on tietoinen asiakkaiden raporteista ja tutkii ongelmaa parhaillaan. Vpn-palveluntarjoajan mukaan on mahdollista, että heidän toimintansa on estetty Venäjällä. Venäjä on estänyt useita eri vpn-palveluja jo ennen maan aloittamaa sotaa Ukrainassa. Vpn-palvelut muodostavat vaaran Kremlin propagandalle, jossa hyökkäyksestä Ukrainaan puhutaan “sotilaallisena erikoisoperaationa” eikä sotana.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Sotasaaliiksi saaduissa venäläisaseissa karu löydös https://www.is.fi/digitoday/art-2000008851121.html
Venäjän aseteknologia perustuu melkein kokonaan amerikkalaisiin mikrosiruihin.
Taistelukentältä löytyneitä siruja ovat valmistaneet ainakin ainakin Intel, Micrel, Micron Techology, Atmel Corp, AMD, Rochester Electronics, Texas Instruments, Linear Technology, Cypress Semiconductor, Maxim Integrated, XILINX, Infineon Technologies, Onsemi, IDT, Altera USA, Burr-Brown, Analog Devices Inc, Linear Technology ja TE Connectivity.
Venäjän aloitettua täysimittaisen hyökkäyssodan Ukrainaan sotateknologiaan tarkoitettujen piirien vienti maahan kiellettiin osana Venäjän vastaisia pakotteita. Nyt nähdyt piirit ovat ajalta ennen pakotteita.
Naton ja Yhdysvaltain armeijan elektronisen sodankäynnin asiantuntija Skip Parish kommentoi The Drivelle löydösten tarkoittavan ”täydellistä riippuvuutta länsiteknologiasta”. Pakotteet eivät kuitenkaan välttämättä lopeta mikropiirien vientiä Venäjälle, sillä Kiinassa on laaja harmaa sirumarkkina.
Venäjä on ilmoittanut jo vuonna 2014 pyrkivänsä omavaraisuuteen siruvalmistuksessa. Venäläinen piirisuunnittelu on kuitenkin tehoiltaan useita vuosia amerikkalaisia jäljessä, minkä lisäksi maassa ei juuri ole sirutehtaita ja sirujen valmistukseen käytettävän teknologian patentit ovat etupäässä amerikkalaisia. Tämä jättää vaihtoehdoksi harmaisiin valmistusmarkkinoihin turvautumisen.
Captured Russian Weapons Are Packed With U.S. Microchips
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/captured-russian-weapons-are-packed-with-foreign-microchips
Ukraine intelligence showed us lists of mostly U.S.-made microchips it says were found on captured or destroyed Russian military equipment.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Top10VPN:
Docs reveal Russian officials’ need to circumvent their own government’s internet censorship, with 236 procurement contracts for VPN tech since the war started
Russian VPN Spending Since the Invasion of Ukraine
https://www.top10vpn.com/research/russia-vpn-spending/
The Russian Federal Treasury has published over 200 official procurement documents for VPN technology with a combined value of almost $10 million since the invasion of Ukraine. The documents reveal state officials’ need to circumvent their own government’s censorship of the internet in Russia.
236 official contracts for VPN technology worth over $9.8 million have been made public since the invasion of Ukraine
State institutions and companies regulated by public procurement law based in Moscow spent more than any other region, totalling 196 million rubles ($2.4 million).
Customers:
188 government contracts: including the Federal Customs Service and ‘Information Technologies in the Social Sphere’ department
48 company contracts: including 23 joint-stock companies, 2 LLCs and 23 unitary enterprises
Tomi Engdahl says:
No fast processors for you! (if you live in Russia)
Taiwan Restricts Russia, Belarus to CPUs Under 25 MHz Frequency
By Anton Shilov published about 11 hours ago
https://www.tomshardware.com/news/taiwan-restricts-exports-of-25mhz-cpus-to-russia?utm_content=tomsguide&utm_campaign=socialflow&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social
No more Taiwan-made CPUs, microcontrollers for Russia and Belarus.
From now on, Russian and Belarusian entities can only buy CPUs operating at below 25 MHz and offering performance of up to 5 GFLOPS from Taiwanese companies. This essentially excludes all modern technology, including microcontrollers for more or less sophisticated devices.
Items banned from exportation to Russia and Belarus are pursuant to Category 3 to Category 9 of Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation equipment, maritime technology, navigation, avionics, jet engines, and a number of other categories.
Starting today, Russian entities cannot buy chips that meet one of the following conditions from Taiwanese companies, reports DigiTimes:
Has performance of 5 GFLOPS. To put it into context, Sony’s PlayStation 2 released in 2000 had peak performance of around 6.2 FP32 GFLOPS.
Operates at 25 MHz or higher.
Has an ALU that is wider than 32 bits.
Has an external interconnection with a data transfer rate of 2.5 MB/s or over.
Has more than 144 pins.
Has basic gate propagation delay time of less than 0.4 nanosecond.
In addition to being unable to buy chips from Taiwanese companies, Russian entities will not be able to get any chip production equipment from Taiwan
Speaking of chip production in Russia, it is interesting to note that MCST, the developer of Elbrus CPUs, is negotiating with Russian contract chipmaker Mikron to make processors domestically
Tomi Engdahl says:
US export ban on hacking tools tweaked after public consultation https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/us-export-ban-on-hacking-tools-tweaked-after-public-consultation
As concern mounts about the security risks posed by overseas hackers, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has published revisions to its ban on certain cybersecurity exports. The prohibition first announced last October effectively bans the export of hacking software and equipment to China, Russia, and a number of other countries without a license from the BIS.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Alexander Martin / Sky News:
US Cyber Command head Paul Nakasone confirms that US military hackers have conducted cyberattacks in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s invasion — In an exclusive interview with Sky News, General Paul Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the US had “conducted a series of operations” …
US military hackers conducting offensive operations in support of Ukraine, says head of Cyber Command
In an exclusive interview with Sky News, General Paul Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the US had “conducted a series of operations” in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
https://news.sky.com/story/us-military-hackers-conducting-offensive-operations-in-support-of-ukraine-says-head-of-cyber-command-12625139
US military hackers have conducted offensive operations in support of Ukraine, the head of US Cyber Command has told Sky News.
In an exclusive interview, General Paul Nakasone also explained how separate “hunt forward” operations were allowing the United States to search out foreign hackers and identify their tools before they were used against America.
Speaking in Tallinn, Estonia, the general, who is also director of the National Security Agency (NSA), told Sky News that he is concerned “every single day” about the risk of a Russian cyber attack targeting the US and said that the hunt forward activities were an effective way of protecting both America as well as allies.
General Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the US was conducting offensive hacking operations in support of Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion.
The four star general did not detail the activities, but explained how they were lawful, conducted with complete civilian oversight of the military and through policy decided at the Department of Defence.
“My job is to provide a series of options to the secretary of defence and the president, and so that’s what I do,” he said. He declined to describe those options.
But he noted how in contrast to Russia, which conducts information operations by beginning with a lie, the US aims to strategically tell the truth.
Ukraine’s intriguing resilience
General Nakasone disagreed with commentators who suggested that the cyber aspects of the Russian assault on Ukraine had been overblown and praised the Kyiv government and defenders for their resilience.
“If you asked the Ukrainians, they wouldn’t say it’s been overblown. If you take a look at the destructive attacks and disruptive attacks that they’ve encountered – you wrote about it in terms of the attack on [satellite company] Viasat – this is something that has been ongoing,” he added.
The general continued: “And we’ve seen this with regards to the attack on their satellite systems, wiper attacks that have been ongoing, disruptive attacks against their government processes.
“This is kind of the piece that I think sometimes is missed by the public. It isn’t like they haven’t been very busy, they have been incredibly busy. And I think, you know, their resilience is perhaps the story that is most intriguing to all of us.”
Concern about Russian attacks targeting America
Asked how high the risk was of Russian attacks targeting the US, General Nakasone said: “We remain vigilant every single day. Every single day. I think about it all the time.”
“This is why we’re working with a series of partners to ensure we prevent that, not only against the United States but against our allies as well,” he added.
General Nakasone had delivered a keynote speech at CyCon, an international conference on cyber conflict, hosted by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, and praised the partnerships between democratic states as a key strategic benefit.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Ukrainian Volunteers Use 3D Printers to Save Lives They churn out bandages and periscopes for fighters on the frontlines
https://spectrum.ieee.org/ukraine-3d-printing?utm_campaign=RebelMouse&socialux=facebook&share_id=7058362&utm_medium=social&utm_content=IEEE+Spectrum&utm_source=facebook
Tomi Engdahl says:
Insight: Russia is failing’ in its mission to destabilize Ukraine’s networks after a series of thwarted cyber-attacks https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/insight-russia-is-failing-in-its-mission-to-destabilize-ukraines-networks-after-a-series-of-thwarted-cyber-attacks
That was the takeaway from WithSecure’s Sphere conference this week, as chief research officer Mikko Hyppönen told attendees that Putin’s regime is “largely failing”. During the event, held in Helsinki, Finland, Mikko shared insight into the conflict between the two countries, which has now been ongoing for more than three months.
Tomi Engdahl says:
US ran offensive cyber ops to support Ukraine, says general https://www.theregister.com/2022/06/02/nakasone_us_hacking_russia/
We’ve conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum; offensive, defensive, [and] information operations, ” General Nakasone told Sky News in an interview that aired Wednesday. Nakasone, who also serves as director of the NSA, didn’t provide specific details about the offensive operations, though he said they were lawful and complied with US policy.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Volodymyr Zelensky on War, Technology, and the Future of Ukraine https://www.wired.com/story/volodymyr-zelensky-q-and-a-ukraine-war-technology/
In a one-on-one interview with WIRED, the embattled president expresses clarity amidst the chaos. Ever since Russian forces started their all-out invasion in February, Ukraine has been hailed as an exemplar of how to defend against violent tyranny on the 21st-century battlefield. The country spun up an “IT Army” of volunteer hackers to take down Russian websites, used the Starlink satellite internet system to maintain communications as its own infrastructure was being destroyed, and launched a social media blitzkrieg to win support from around the world.
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://www.ft.com/content/e62a1ef1-22d9-4591-bda4-0a0d5e5f6c15
How the EU’s ban on Russian oil will rock global markets
Refiners will face fierce competition to secure supplies as Brussels imposes sanctions on seaborne exports
In the early hours of Tuesday morning, leaders of the EU’s 27 member states agreed to ban seaborne Russian oil imports.
To placate landlocked countries such as Hungary, pipeline shipments will continue for now. But Germany’s and Poland’s willingness to taper their pipeline purchases by 2022’s close should, combined with the seaborne ban, see Russian oil exports to the EU decline by 90 per cent by the end of the year.
Although the phase-in will ease the disruption caused by the ban, Florian Thaler, chief executive of OilX, an oil analytics company, said the impact would still be “very consequential”.
While there are short-term winners, such as refiners connected to the Druzhba pipeline, the drive to wean Europe off Russian oil will shake up its hydrocarbons industry and global crude markets.
“Competition for remaining barrels in an already stretched global market will be fierce, and there will be very limited scope for relief to oil prices,” Thaler said.
How will the ban affect oil markets?
Prices of oil from elsewhere will rise as European refineries quickly seek out replacement supplies.
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://www.iflscience.com/technology/pentagon-impressed-by-starinks-eyewateringly-swift-shut-down-of-russian-cyberattack/
Tomi Engdahl says:
About those kill-switched Ukrainian tractors
What John Deere did to Russian looters, anyone can do to farmers, anywhere.
https://doctorow.medium.com/about-those-kill-switched-ukrainian-tractors-bc93f471b9c8
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://uk.pcmag.com/components/140465/russia-picks-a-slow-chinese-x86-cpu-to-replace-intelamd-chips
Tomi Engdahl says:
Export bans prompt Russia to use Chinese x86 CPU replacement
With few options, Russia will look to half-fast chips from Chinese maker
https://www.theregister.com/2022/05/19/export_bans_prompt_russia_to/
Tomi Engdahl says:
Captured Russian Weapons Are Packed With U.S. Microchips
Ukraine intelligence showed us lists of mostly U.S.-made microchips it says were found on captured or destroyed Russian military equipment.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/captured-russian-weapons-are-packed-with-foreign-microchips
Tomi Engdahl says:
CoolCola, Starduck’s, DonMak… Tutut länsibrändit korvattiin Venäjällä kopioilla https://www.is.fi/taloussanomat/art-2000008864548.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
Anonymous Hacktivists Leak 1TB of Top Russian Law Firm Data
https://www.hackread.com/anonymous-hacktivists-leak-1tb-russia-law-firm-data/
Rustam Kurmaev and Partners work with the Russian government and other high-profile banking, media, oil, and industrial companies, including American firms.
The Anonymous hacktivists collective has struck Russia again by leaking approximately 1TB of data from a leading Russian law firm identified as Rustam Kurmaev and Partners (RKP Law).
The news arrives just a day after the collective leaked hundreds of gigabytes of data from the servers of Russia’s largest media holdings with over 100 regional radio stations, Vyberi Radio.
Tomi Engdahl says:
RUSSIA BANS THE EXPORT OF INERT GASES SUCH AS NEON AND HELIUM
https://www.gizchina.com/2022/06/03/russia-bans-the-export-of-inert-gases-such-as-neon-and-helium/#Echobox=1654289325
According to Taiwanese media “Economic Daily”, citing a report from India’s “Economic Times”, Russia has restricted the export of inert gases such as helium and neon. This restriction is mainly for companies that use these gases for chip production. Since Russia and Ukraine are collectively one of the largest exporters of helium and neon gasses, this is a problem. For helium, the U.S. is by far the largest producer. Other large producers are Qatar, Algeria, and Russia. However, the U.S. is quite conservative with its natural resources. Thus, you can be sure that the U.S. will not just fill the vacuum that Russia will leave behind.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Ukraina käyttää Uberin kaltaista ohjelmaa tykistöiskun tilaamiseen – käytössä myös kuuluisassa joenylitystaistelussa https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000008855802.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitukset/art-2000008863276.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
Venäjä kiristi rajusti nettisensuuria
https://www.is.fi/digitoday/tietoturva/art-2000008862046.html
Hyökkäyssotaa Ukrainassa käyvä Venäjä on kiristänyt nettisensuuriaan.
Maa on alkanut häiritä vpn-yhteyksiä, jotka mahdollistavat pääsyn estetyille ulkomaisille verkkosivustoille. Sveitsiläinen Proton VPN kertoi keskiviikkona, että siihen on kohdistunut häirintää venäläisten nettioperaattorien ja viranomaisten taholta. Palvelu sanoo tekevänsä parhaansa kiertääkseen estot. Myös suositun NordVPN-palvelun käytössä Venäjällä on ollut vakavia häiriöitä Venäjällä. Lisäksi myös Lantern- ja Outline-vpn-palveluissa on ollut ongelmia, kertoo venäjänkielinen Mediazona. Meduza kertoo myös L2TP- ja IPsec-palveluiden kärsineen häiriöistä.
Tomi Engdahl says:
100 days of war in Ukraine: How the conflict is playing out in cyberspace https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/06/03/100-days-war-ukraine-conflict-cyberspace/
On January 14th this year, a raid by Russian law enforcement authorities made headlines all over the world, as it resulted in the arrests of 14 members of the infamous Sodinokibi/REvil ransomware gang. The crackdown came after a series of talks between U.S. and Russian officials, including June’s Geneva meeting between Presidents Biden and Putin. The Russian intelligence agency, FSB, confirmed that “the individual responsible for the attack on Colonial Pipeline last spring” was arrested as part of the raid. At the time, when a Russian invasion of Ukraine was a real possibility, some saw this development as a “huge result that few would expect.” Others even called it “Russian ransomware diplomacy”, a kind of message to the U.S. about how far Russia was willing to go in exchange for lighter sanctions over a future invasion of Ukraine.
Tomi Engdahl says:
ESET Threat Report T1 2022
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/06/02/eset-threat-report-t12022/
After more than two years of shielding from a global pandemic, we get a reward’: war! Several conflicts are raging in different parts of the world, but for us, this one is different. Right across Slovakia’s eastern borders, where ESET has its HQ and several offices, Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and sovereignty in this unprovoked war, facing an opponent that possesses nuclear weapons. As you will read in the ESET Threat Report T1 2022, Ukraine is resisting attacks not only in the physical world but also in cyberspace. Our Featured story recounts various cyberattacks connected to the ongoing war that ESET researchers analyzed or helped to mitigate. This includes the resurrection of the infamous Industroyer malware, attempting to target high-voltage electrical substations. The report:
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/eset_threat_report_t12022.pdf
Tomi Engdahl says:
Deadly Secret: Electronic Warfare Shapes Russia-Ukraine War
https://www.securityweek.com/deadly-secret-electronic-warfare-shapes-russia-ukraine-war
On Ukraine’s battlefields, the simple act of powering up a cellphone can beckon a rain of deathly skyfall. Artillery radar and remote controls for unmanned aerial vehicles may also invite fiery shrapnel showers.
This is electronic warfare, a critical but largely invisible aspect of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Military commanders largely shun discussing it, fearing they’ll jeopardize operations by revealing secrets.
Electronic warfare technology targets communications, navigation and guidance systems to locate, blind and deceive the enemy and direct lethal blows. It is used against artillery, fighter jets, cruise missiles, drones and more. Militaries also use it to protect their forces.
It’s an area where Russia was thought to have a clear advantage going into the war. Yet, for reasons not entirely clear, its much-touted electronic warfare prowess was barely seen in the war’s early stages in the chaotic failure to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.
It has become far more of a factor in fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine, where shorter, easier-to-defend supply lines let Russia move electronic warfare gear closer to the battlefield.
“They are jamming everything their systems can reach,” said an official of Aerorozvidka, a reconnaissance team of Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle tinkerers, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of safety concerns. “We can’t say they dominate, but they hinder us greatly.”
A Ukrainian intelligence official called the Russian threat “pretty severe” when it comes to disrupting reconnaissance efforts and commanders’ communications with troops. Russian jamming of GPS receivers on drones that Ukraine uses to locate the enemy and direct artillery fire is particularly intense “on the line of contact,” he said.
Ukraine has scored some successes in countering Russia’s electronic warfare efforts. It has captured important pieces of hardware — a significant intelligence coup — and destroyed at least two multi-vehicle mobile electronic warfare units.
Its own electronic warfare capability is hard to assess.
Ukraine has also made effective use of technology and intelligence from the United States and other NATO members. Such information helped Ukraine sink the battle cruiser Moskva. Allied satellites and surveillance aircraft help from nearby skies, as does billionaire Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite communications network.
Electronic war has three basic elements: probe, attack and protect. First, intelligence is gathered by locating enemy electronic signals. On attack, “white noise” jamming disables and degrades enemy systems, including radio and cellphone communications, air defense and artillery radars. Then there is spoofing, which confuses and deceives. When it works, munitions miss their targets.
“Operating on a modern battlefield without data is really hard,” said retired Col. Laurie Buckhout, a former U.S. Army electronic warfare chief. Jamming “can blind and deafen an aircraft very quickly and very dangerously, especially if you lose GPS and radar and you’re a jet flying at 600 miles an hour.”
All of which explains the secrecy around electronic warfare.
“It is an incredibly classified field because it is highly dependent on evolving, bleeding-edge technologies where gains can be copied and erased very quickly,” said James Stidham, a communications security expert who has consulted for the U.S. State and Homeland Security departments.
Ukraine learned hard lessons about electronic warfare in 2014 and 2015, when Russia overwhelmed its forces with it. The Russians knocked drones out of the sky and disabled warheads, penetrated cellphone networks for psychological ops and zeroed in on Ukrainian armor.
The U.S. also experienced Russia’s electronic warfare in action in Syria, where the adversaries have backed opposing sides in the civil war. In 2018, U.S. Special Operations chief Gen. Raymond Thomas described how U.S. pilots’ communications were regularly “knocked down” in Syria in the “most aggressive” electronic warfare environment on the planet. Russia’s advanced systems are designed to blind U.S. Airborne Warning and Control Systems, or AWACS, aircraft — the eyes and ears of battlefield commanders — as well as cruise missiles and spy satellites.
In the current war, electronic warfare has become a furious theater of contention.
Aerorozvidka has modified camera-equipped drones to pinpoint enemy positions and drop mortars and grenades. Hacking is also used to poison or disable enemy electronics and collect intelligence.
Ukrainian officials say their electronic warfare capabilities have improved radically since 2015. They include the use of encrypted U.S and Turkish communications gear for a tactical edge. Ukraine has advanced so much it exports some of its technology.
Russia has engaged in GPS jamming in areas from Finland to the Black Sea, said Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel, an Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council. One regional Finnish carrier, Transaviabaltica, had to cancel flights on one route for a week as a result. Russian jamming has also disrupted Ukrainian television broadcasting, said Frank Backes, an executive with California-based Kratos Defense, which has satellite ground stations in the region.
Yet in the war’s early days, Russia’s use of electronic warfare was less effective and extensive than anticipated. That may have contributed to its failure to destroy enough radar and anti-aircraft units to gain air superiority.
Some analysts believe Russian commanders held back units fearing the units would be captured. At least two were seized. One was a Krasukha-4, which a U.S. Army database says is designed to jam satellite signals as well as surveillance radar and radar-guided weapons from more than 100 miles (160 kilometers) away. The other: the more advanced Borisoglebsk-2, which can jam drone guidance systems and radio-controlled land mines.
Russia may have also limited the use of electronic warfare early in the conflict because of concerns that ill-trained or poorly motivated technicians might not operate it properly.
“What we’re learning now is that the Russians eventually turned it off because it was interfering with their own communications so much,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former U.S. Army commander for Europe.
The communications problems were evident with many Russian troops talking on insecure open radio channels, easily monitored by outsiders.
It’s unclear how much of an edge Russia’s electronic assets may now offer.
Russia has lost about 50 of its Orlan-10s in the war, but “whatever they lost could be a small portion of what’s flying,”
Ukraine’s relative UAV strength is unclear, but Ukrainians have adapted such technologies as software-defined radio and 3D printing to stay nimble.
The U.S. and Britain also supply jamming gear, but how much it helps is unclear. Neither country has offered details. The ability of both sides to disable the other’s drones is crucial with the artillery they scout now so decisive in battles.
Musk’s Starlink is a proven asset. Its more than 2,200 low-orbiting satellites provide broadband internet to more than 150,000 Ukrainian ground stations. Severing those connections is a challenge for Russia. It is far more difficult to jam low-earth orbiting satellites than geostationary ones.
Musk has won plaudits from the Pentagon for at least temporarily defeating Russian jamming of Ukrainian satellite uplinks with a quick software fix. But he has warned Ukrainians to keep those terminals powered down when possible — they are vulnerable to geolocation — and recently worried on Twitter about redoubled Russian interference efforts.
“I’m sure that the Russians are getting smarter about that now,” said Wetzel, the Air Force lieutenant colonel.
Tomi Engdahl says:
The Great Euro Sat Hack Should Be A Warning To Us All
https://hackaday.com/2022/06/02/the-great-euro-sat-hack-should-be-a-warning-to-us-all/
Military officials and civilian security researchers have been warning us for years: cyberattacks are becoming a very real part of modern warfare. Far from being limited to military targets, cyberattacks can take out everything from vital public infrastructure to commercial and industrial operations, too.
In the early hours of February 24, as the Russian invasion force began raining missiles on Ukrainian cities, another attack was in progress in the digital realm. Suddenly, satellite terminals across Europe were going offline, with many suffering permanent damage from the attack.
Details remain hazy, but researchers and military analysts have pieced together a picture of what happened that night. The Great Euro Sat Hack prove to be the latest example of how vulnerable our digital infrastructure can be in wartime.
A Network Is Only As Secure As Its Weakest Point
The KA-SAT satellite operated owned by US company Viasat was launched in 2010. It’s charged with providing broadband satellite internet across Europe, with some limited coverage also extending to parts of the Middle East. Customers of the service include residential users across Europe, and many industrial systems as well.
On February 24, when Russian forces began their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the KA-SAT system similarly came under attack. Thousands of terminals suddenly went offline in the early hours of the morning. Far from being limited to just Ukraine, users in Greece, Poland, Italy, Hungary, and Germany were all affected.
Notably, 5,800 wind turbines in Germany had their administration systems go dark as the attack raged. When the satellite links went down, monitoring the wind turbines via SCADA systems was no longer possible. Thankfully, grid stability was not affected according to operator ENERCON, as grid operators maintained control over the wind power input to the grid via other methods.
Early reports speculated that a simple distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack may have been to blame. This type of attack, where floods of traffic are used to overwhelm a network or server, is simplistic and short-lived.
However, it quickly became apparent that a much more serious attack had taken place. Researchers analyzing the fallout noted that many terminals had been permanently taken offline, and were no longer operable. Information slowly trickled out from various sources, indicating that the satellite itself had not been tampered with, nor damaged or physically attacked in any way. Thus, the issue likely laid in the ground segment of the KA-SAT network.
Just over a month after the attack, Viasat released a statement explaining the scale and nature of the attack. According to the company’s report, action began at 03:02 AM UTC with a denial of service attack propagating from users of using SurfBeam 2 and Surfbeam2+ modems on a consumer-orientated section of the KA-SAT network. These modems located in Ukraine were generating large volumes of malicious traffic and were preventing legitimate users from remaining online. Viasat’s technical teams worked to block these malicious modems from the network, with more popping up as the team took them down.
Later analysis showed that a breach had occurred in the management systems of the KA-SAT network, via a “misconfiguration in a VPN appliance.” The attackers accessed the management network and used it to issue commands to residential modems on the network, corrupting the flash memory onboard and rendering them inoperable.
In the aftermath, security researcher Ruben Santamarta was able to lay his hands on an affected Surfbeam2 modem, as well as another clean device untouched by the attack. Dumping the flash memory from both modems was revealing. The compromised modem had heavily corrupted flash memory compared to the original, which left the modems in a non-working state. The damage was so complete in some cases that affected modems would not even display status lights when turned on. 0,000 replacement modems were ultimately shipped to customers to get them back online in the weeks following the attack.
There are still some questions to be answered regarding the attack. It’s unclear precisely how attackers entered the management segment of the KA-SAT network, and the company is reticent to publicise what happened.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Ukrainan sota on aiheuttanut Suomeen yllättäviä puutteita – ”En olisi koskaan uskonut” https://www.is.fi/taloussanomat/art-2000008859283.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
Kommersant: Venäjän varaosamarkkinat täyttymässä hengenvaarallisilla väärennöksillä – ja tätä kaikkea siitä seuraa
https://www.is.fi/autot/art-2000008866989.html
Rinnakkaistuonnin tuloksena venäläisiä odottaa myös varaosien alkuperään liittyvä laatukatastrofi.
Kestääkö aidolta merkkiosalta vaikuttava tulppa tai toimiiko juuri vaihdettu elektroniikkaosa lainkaan kuten pitää? Tai voiko autoilija luottaa siihen, että huollossa vaihdetut öljyt eivät hajota moottoria?
Niin sanotun rinnakkaistuonnin eli ilman alkuperäisen valmistajan lupaa valmistettujen varaosien myynnin ja maahantuonnin salliminen on täyttämässä Venäjän varaosamarkkinat hallitsemattomalla tuoterepertuaarilla sekä myös vaarallisilla väärennöksillä, kertoo Moskovassa ilmestyvä talouslehti Kommersant.
Venäjällä äskettäin hyväksytyn rinnakkaistuontiasetuksen mukaan esimerkiksi noin neljänkymmenen automerkin ja kymmenien läntisten varaosavalmistajien tuotteita voi tuoda maahan ilman kyseisten valmistajien lupaa ja todistuksia alkuperästä.
Tällaisen niin sanotun rinnakkaistuonnin sallimisen sivuvaikutus on osien alkuperävalvonnan muuttuminen mahdottomaksi, minkä myötä Venäjällä myydään pian valtavia määriä varaosia, joiden taustaa ei voi enää mitenkään varmistaa.
Ja koska alkuperää ei voi eikä sitä myöten edes tarvitse tietää, kannattaa Venäjälle myydä erityisesti sellaisia osia, joiden valmistuskustannus on mahdollisimman edullinen – mutta joista voidaan samalla pyytää mahdollisimman kovaa hintaa.
Esimerkiksi automerkin omassa paketissa myytävä uusi vanne tulee siis entistä useammin olemaan visuaalisesti mahdollisimman hyvän ja aidon oloinen väärennös, mutta jossa vaikkapa kestävyys- tai turvallisuusseikoilla ei ole enää mitään väliä.
Ja kun alkuperävalvontaa ei enää ole, ei edes merkkiorganisaatio voi enää tietää, mistä mitkäkin varaosat ovat lopulta kotoisin.
Ja koska väärennetyt varaosat eivät aina toimi kuten auton tai muun laitteen tai koneen valmistaja on tarkoittanut, on seurauksena valtava määrä ennenaikaisia rikkoutumisia ja pahimmillaan jopa hengenvaarallisia tilanteita.
Esimerkiksi mainittu väärennetty vanne voi irrota vauhdissa pyörännavasta tai renkaasta, väärennetty jarrupala pidentää jarrutusmatkaa kymmenillä metreillä tai väärennetty öljy aiheuttaa moottorin tai vaihteiston täystuhon.
Asiantuntijat neuvovatkin nyt venäläisautoilijoita olemaan erityisen varovaisia varsinkin niin sanottuihin kulutus- ja huolto-osiin eli esimerkiksi öljyihin, suodattimiin ja jarruihin liittyvissä ostoksissa.
Vastaavat varaosaongelmat koskettavat autojen ohella myös suurta määrää muitakin Venäjällä käytössä olevia koneita ja laitteita.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Maansa armeijaan pettynyt venäläissotilas tilitti BBC:lle kokemuksiaan Ukrainasta: ”Olimme kuin sokeat kissanpennut”
BBC kertoo haastatelleensa venäläissotilasta, joka kieltäytyi palaamasta Ukrainaan ja kritisoi muun muassa Venäjän joukkojen varustelua.
https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000008866332.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
Hakkerit iskivät Venäjän rakennusministeriöön: “Kunnia Ukrainalle”
https://www.tivi.fi/uutiset/tv/94d23a73-da93-4e90-b765-fcf8e0728181
Venäjän rakennus-, asunto- ja julkisten palveluiden ministeriöön kohdistui kyberhyökkäys 5. kesäkuuta. Ministeriön venäjänkielisellä etusivulla ollut hakkerien viesti kertoo, että ministeriön koko tietokanta on varastettu ja se saatetaan julkaista hakkerifoorumilla.
Riippumattoman Novaja Gazeta Europen mukaan iskun takana ovat DumpForums.com-ryhmään kuuluvat hakkerit. Kyseessä on luultavimmin kiristysisku, sillä hakkerit vaativat ministeriötä maksamaan 0, 5 bitcoinia, mikäli varastettuja tietoja ei haluta julkisuuteen.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Olisiko Saksa voinut estää Ukrainan sodan? Asiantuntija vastaa
Suomalaistutkija kohdistaisi kysymyksen vain Saksan sijaan koko läntiselle yhteisölle.
https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/ee9b4eb5-fca2-46bc-b9a9-6d9cb9365357
Luttwakin mukaan Saksa ja sen toiminta – sekä toimettomuus – hyökkäystä edeltävinä viikkoina oli avainasemassa Venäjän sinetöidessä päätöksensä hyökätä.
– Liittokansleri Olaf Scholzin strategia oli tuolloin väärä. Jos hän olisi silloin sanonut, että mikäli Venäjä hyökkää Ukrainaan, Nord Stream 2 -hanke pysäytetään, Saksa toimittaa aseita Ukrainaan ja että Saksa sallisi Viron viedä tykistöä Ukrainaan, Putin ei olisi mitä todennäköisimmin hyökännyt, Luttwak kuvaili Die Weltille.
Saksan vastausta Ukrainaan kohdistuvaan hyökkäykseen, erityisesti yhä jatkuvaa kaasun ja öljyn tuontia, on toki kevään mittaan kritisoitu useastakin suunnasta.
Siinä missä Saksan nihkeys aseavun toimituksissa perustunee historiaan pohjautuvaan pyrkimykseen edetä erimielisyyksissä diplomatian keinoin, on maa kevään mittaan itsekin myöntänyt virheensä muodostettuaan riippuvuuden Venäjän energialähteistä.
Samaa mieltä on myös sotilasasiantuntija Luttwak, joka haastattelussaan toteaa Saksan Venäjä-politiikan menneen metsään jo pidemmän aikaa, nostaen räikeäksi esimerkiksi juurikin mainitun Nord Stream 2 -kaasuputkihankeen. Uuden, Venäjän Ust-Lugasta Saksan Greifswaldiin kulkevan putken oli tarkoitus jopa tuplata Venäjän kaasuntuonti Saksaan.
Putken rakennus aloitettiin kiistanalaisissa olosuhteissa Venäjän vallattua Krimin niemimaan vuonna 2014, mitä Luttwak kutsuu ”vihreän valon näyttämiseksi Putinille”. Paitsi että uusi putki tulisi valmistuttuaan tekemään Saksan taloudellisesti riippuvaiseksi Venäjästä, sen rakennukseen suostuminen myös antoi Luttwakin mukaan Venäjän ymmärtää Saksan ja lännen laajemminkin olevan varsin piittaamaton Ukrainan kohtalosta.
Jaettu vastuu
Olisiko Saksa siis voinut tehdä mitään estääkseen Ukrainaan kohdistuvan hyökkäyssodan?
– Mielestäni tätä kysymystä ei voi asettaa koskemaan pelkästään Saksaa. Vuoden 2014 jälkeenkin ne toimet, joita EU ja Yhdysvallat ovat tehneet, ovat olleet vahvasti koordinoituja keskenään, Iso-Markku toteaa.
– Ennemminkin voisi siis kysyä, että olisiko koko tämä läntinen yhteisö, joka nyt tuomitsee hyökkäyksen ja tukee Ukrainaa niin poliittisesti, taloudellisesti, humanitaarisesti, sotilaallisesti kuin aseellisestikin, voinut jo aiemmin tehdä jotain toisin. Saksa toki omalta osaltaan yhtenä osana tätä yhteisöä.
Iso-Markku myöntää, että jälkikäteen tarkasteltuna hankkeen käynnistys näyttäytyy Saksan osalta harha-askeleelta, joka jo alkuaikoinaan kohtasi laajaa vastustusta muilta länsimailta.
– Tästä ei kuitenkaan mielestäni voi vetää sellaista johtopäätöstä, että Saksa olisi syyllinen tähän hyökkäykseen, se on mielestäni aika raju kärjistys, Iso-Markku summaa.
Kevään edetessä Saksa on taipunut irtautumaan Venäjän energiasta. Maan odotetaan luopuvan Venäjän öljystä kuluvan vuoden loppuun mennessä ja kaasusta viimeistään vuonna 2024.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Lukasz Olejnik / Wired:
How Ukrainian civilians are helping the army using apps, blurring the lines between civilians and soldiers, raising questions of international humanitarian law
Smartphones Blur the Line Between Civilian and Combatant
https://www.wired.com/story/smartphones-ukraine-civilian-combatant/
In Ukraine, civilians are valiantly assisting the army via apps—and challenging a tenet of international law in the process.
As Russia continues its unprovoked armed aggression, reports from Ukraine note that the smartphones in civilians’ pockets may be “weapons powerful in their own way as rockets and artillery.” Indeed, technologists in the country have quickly created remarkable apps to keep citizens safe and assist the war effort—everything from an air-raid alert app to the rapid repurposing of the government’s Diia app. The latter was once used by more than 18 million Ukrainians for things like digital IDs, but it now allows users to report the movements of invading soldiers through the “e-Enemy” feature. “Anyone can help our army locate Russian troops. Use our chat bot to inform the Armed Forces,” the Ministry of Digital Transformation said of the new capability when it rolled out.
Naturally, the Ukrainian people want to defend their country and aid their army in whatever ways they can. But certain uses of digital technology pose fundamental challenges to the traditional distinction between civilians and combatants in modern times.
Technically speaking, as soon as a user in a war zone picks up a smartphone to assist the army, both the technology and the individual could be considered sensors, or nodes, in the practice known as ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Inviting citizens to become a potential element in a military system, as the e-Enemy feature does, might blur the lines between civilian and combatant activity.
The principle of distinction between the two roles is a critical cornerstone of international humanitarian law—the law of armed conflict, codified by decades of customs and laws such as the Geneva Conventions. Those considered civilians and civilian targets are not to be attacked by military forces; as they are not combatants, they should be spared. At the same time, they also should not act as combatants—if they do, they may lose this status.
The conundrum, then, is how to classify a civilian who, with the use of their smartphone, potentially becomes an active participant in a military sensor system. (To be clear, solely having the app installed is not sufficient to lose the protected status. What matters is actual usage.) The Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions states that civilians enjoy protection from the “dangers arising from military operations unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Legally, if civilians engage in military activity, such as taking part in hostilities by using weapons, they forfeit their protected status, “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” that “affect[s] the military operations,” according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the traditional impartial custodian of International Humanitarian Law. This is the case even if the people in question are not formally members of the armed forces. By losing the status of a civilian, one may become a legitimate military objective, carrying the risk of being directly attacked by military forces.
The most obvious way to resolve this confusion might be to accept that a user-civilian temporarily loses their protected civilian status, at least while using such an app. In some cases, this may be a minutes-long “status-switch,” as fast as picking up the smartphone from one’s pocket, taking a photo, or typing a short message. It is not direct, sustained participation in the conflict but rather a sporadic one.
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it is not established, and not all sides will necessarily agree on it. The situation becomes even more complex if someone uses the app regularly. How would “regularly” even be measured?
The power of certain smartphone uses to turn a civilian into a form of a “combatant” one minute, and back into a civilian the next, introduces unprecedented complications to the long-held laws of war.
This may seem negligible, as it is clear that Russian forces have already targeted civilians in many places in blatant violation of international humanitarian laws and human rights. But users voluntarily forfeiting civilian status via the use of a smartphone app could potentially make matters even more complicated, especially if and when a person in question is captured. Ordinary lawful combatants in captivity are considered prisoners of war—they cannot be lawfully prosecuted for war activity and should be guaranteed hygienic conditions, access to medicine, and food during captivity. But this might not be granted for “irregular” or “unlawful” combatants, who could also be put on trial.
This murkiness makes it essential that Ukraine be transparent with users about the actual and potential consequences of engaging with the app. Further, this issue begs for urgent assessment by scholars, policymakers, and military analysts. At a minimum, users should be made aware of the possibilities, including the potential loss of protected legal standing. Lines must be delineated—and quickly, not in 20 years, after the useless rounds of negotiations that have become something of a habit.
Already, there have been reports of Russian forces seeking smartphone devices, and even killing civilians spotted with phones. This is blatantly unlawful, but we must not conclude that this means there are no rules in times of international conflict.
While it is clear that Ukraine faces an existential threat, and it must be expected to do everything possible with the resources it has at hand, its activities now could influence future models of conduct, and after some time, these could become global norms. The precedents set now may have consequences for future armed conflicts. That’s why it’s critical that this issue is recognized and seriously understood, assessed, and addressed. These novel uses of technology could signal the need to adapt the rules, or even to create a place for establishing new ones.
In the meantime, Ukrainians should be wary of having potentially risky material on their phones, for example, photos depicting military matériel.
Personal technology’s role in conflict is challenging the notion of laws of war. Until countries or international bodies provide clarity on this issue, users should remain cautious. In the meantime, the Geneva Conventions mandate that if it’s unclear what a person’s status is, they should be treated as a civilian. Let’s hope all sides will respect that.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Venäjän hakkerit kaappasivat suoran tv-lähetyksen Ukrainassa – ”Palakaa helvetissä, elukat!” https://www.is.fi/jalkapallo/art-2000008870707.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
Mikko Hyppöseltä täysi tylytys Venäjän epäonnistumisesta https://www.is.fi/digitoday/tietoturva/art-2000008860251.html
Tomi Engdahl says:
The Effects Of The Russo-Ukrainian War On The International Car Trade
https://www.qcr.be/en/blog/13?fbclid=IwAR153yE42hmg503n9j4TQolCpM3X6gmV_TFVJM7CAuZR5keAlmj9k8_V5iI
In this modern world, the principles of interconnection are best observed in our economy. There is no significant change in the world that is not affecting the economy and vice versa. We directly experienced this concept during the COVID-19 period, these past two years. But just as the world started to recover, another crisis erupted.
This time it was Russian aggression on Ukraine, which began in late February of 2022. Although Russian officials call it a “special military operation”, it has turned into an all-out war between two major European countries. The war has already displaced millions of people and caused billions of dollars in damage.
Seting aside the political debate, let us observe the profound impact of this conflict on one of the biggest industries in the world – the automotive industry and car trade.
With over 1.6 million cars sold in 2021, Russia finds itself in 8th place on a global scale, just ahead of France. In comparison, Ukraine greatly trails that number, with just over 100,000 vehicles sold in 2021, but this is still very relevant on a European level.
As the bigger sales market with 160 million inhabitants, Russia has far more assembly locations than even Renault-Nissan, BMW, Mercedes, Ford, and Volkswagen, just to name a few. In Ukraine, the car production is limited to a few local truck brands, a smaller Chinese brand, and Skoda models for the local market.
Interestingly, both countries are very important suppliers of automotive parts and materials. Russia exports steel, aluminum, copper, and oil, while Ukraine has numerous factories that produce car industry components, parts, wiring harnesses, car interiors, and so on. So, when two such countries collide, many industries suffer, including the global car industry.
But the effects weren’t just limited to Europe. Ukraine is the world’s largest producer of neon, which is a key element in the production of semiconductor chips. About 70% of the global neon supply is produced in Ukraine as a by-product of the steel production in Russia. As we all know, the chip shortage that has plagued the industry for over two years still isn’t over, and now it has taken an additional hit with the Russo-Ukrainian War.
“The chip shortage that has plagued the industry for over two years has now taken an additional hit with the Russo-Ukrainian War.”
Even though the car companies took the biggest hit, we shouldn’t overlook the used car market since it is an essential aspect of the car trade.
Since the war is still raging, accurate predictions are hard to make. Amongst the experts, there is a general consensus that global vehicle output will be reduced by 2.6 million vehicles in 2022 as a result. However, it does not end there: the global car industry has already suffered losses which can be measured in billions, even without the threats of Russian expropriation.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Has Russia legalised intellectual-property theft?
A new law seems to strip away the IP rights of Western firms
https://www.economist.com/business/2022/06/02/has-russia-legalised-intellectual-property-theft?utm_medium=social-media.content.np&utm_source=facebook&utm_campaign=editorial-social&utm_content=discovery.content
As its economy was being bombarded with Western sanctions in early March, Russia decided to amend a section of its civil code. The world took little notice of decree number 299, which authorised the use of patented inventions, including in medicine and digital technology, from “unfriendly countries” without asking the owner for permission or paying any compensation. Unsurprisingly, Ukraine, which Russia invaded, is deemed “unfriendly”. So are America and the eu, which are not at war with Russia but are pounding its economy and arming the Ukrainians.
Russia’s move is not illegal under international law. Countries are allowed to make exemptions to patent rules in a national emergency. Cumbersome paperwork and tedious price negotiations can cause delays. But some compensation, no matter how paltry, is expected.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Commercial Satellites Are National Security’s Next Frontier
https://spectrum.ieee.org/commercial-satellite-imagery-national-security162
Governments no longer operate all the best spy sats in the sky
On February 18, President Biden, citing U.S. intelligence, announced to the world “we have reason to believe the Russian forces are planning and intend to attack Ukraine in the coming week, in the coming days.” In the months leading up to the invasion in late February, the U.S. intelligence community had been revealing details of Putin’s war plans and disclosing highly classified real-time intelligence in the form of satellite imagery and providing detailed analysis of the movement of Russian forces.
Rather than waiting for bits of unclassified information revealed during official government briefings, the general public has watched the tragic crisis of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfold day-by-day. Never before have we had access to so much real-time data about an ongoing war initiated by a major power such as Russia. Every day, there are countless images, videos, audio files, data about traffic patterns on Google Maps, and high-resolution satellite imagery being shared over social media.
“In the past, only a handful of countries had access to such exquisite capabilities. Today, if other governments, or even NGOs and individuals, disagree with the information provided by one government, they can release their own imagery to prove their point.”
Matt Korda, Senior Research Associate at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), says the handling of this crisis differs from those in previous decades when “governments still maintained a monopoly on satellite imagery. They could decide whether to disclose particular images, how they wanted to do it, and when they wanted to inform the public about things. That is no longer the case. Today, people can conduct surveillance operations from their own homes.”
Several expert analysts interviewed by IEEE Spectrum agree that the rise of affordable and easily accessible commercial satellite imagery played a role in Biden’s early release of U.S. intelligence on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
This time around, the U.S. government appears to have learned from past mistakes. Lewis says, “they’ve grasped that their public strategy had to be different because the expectations of their audience were different. They made falsifiable claims and released commercial satellite imagery to back them up. The government fully expected that civil society would be able to check and verify the claims.”
“Unclassified commercial satellite data acts as an ‘unblinking eye’ and is giving the world access to what was once only held by governments, promoting greater global security and accountability.”
Hanham says she’s “hopeful and inspired that the U.S. is providing actionable intelligence to build trust. This is data that you can share with allies and adversaries alike, and intelligence sources remain protected. Because it’s commercially available, it’s subject to verification by third parties.”
Commercial satellite images, she says, have exerted a powerful equalizing force. “In the past, only a handful of countries had access to such exquisite capabilities,” she says. “Today, if other governments, or even NGOs and individuals, disagree with the information provided by one government, they can release imagery from a commercial provider to prove their point.”
A number of private companies such as Planet and Capella Space are changing the way national security professionals do business by offering affordable access to high-resolution imagery and having an impact on the ground.
Planet operates the world’s largest fleet of Earth imaging satellites, capturing a daily scan of the entire Earth’s surface at a resolution of 3 meters with its PlanetScope constellation of 200 satellites. According to Planet, the company’s SkySat constellation of 21 satellites captures images of ground-level detail down to 50 centimeter length scale—up to ten times per day.
AI and machine learning “will unlock the potential of geospatial data to everyone—not just the experts.”
Dan Getman, Vice President of Product at Capella Space, speaks about the advantages of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors, which “can provide visibility through all weather conditions—clouds, fog, smoke, rain—and capture clear imagery 24-7, day and night, across the globe.”
As recent as five years ago, SAR imagery was far beyond reach of most organizations except for advanced intelligence agencies. Today, Capella offers a wide range of commercial customers access to SAR imagery in a 50 cm ground resolution, allowing for identification of specific features and characteristics of objects on the ground.
It’s hard to imagine national security ever returning to a world in which governments held all the secrets gathered by their own spy satellite programs. “People are visual learners,” Lewis says. “It’s one thing to be told about a facility and another thing to look at a picture. This is a different way of knowing—the difference between showing and telling. It’s not perfect, but it’s really helpful. And it fundamentally changes how you think.”
Tomi Engdahl says:
Ukraine’s secret cyber-defense that blunts Russian attacks: Excellent backups https://www.theregister.com/2022/06/08/silverados_alperovitch_viasat_attack/
The Kremlin-backed cyberattack against satellite communications provider Viasat, which happened an hour before Russia invaded Ukraine, was “one of the biggest cyber events that we have seen, perhaps ever, and certainly in warfare, ” according to Dmitri Alperovitch, a co-founder and former CTO of CrowdStrike and chair of security-centric think tank Silverado Policy Accelerator. “The Russians are horrible at combined arms, ” Alperovitch said, noting this holds true for air and ground military invasion. “And that’s what we’ve seen in cyber as well, ” he added. “Even though they’ve been able to achieve tactical successes on a number of occasions, including in the case of Viasat, they’ve not been able to leverage it to actually prosecute a campaign.
The best tactics, even in cyber, don’t compensate for a really, really bad plan.”
Tomi Engdahl says:
EU cybersecurity agency chief warns of cyberthreats and spillovers https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/eu-cybersecurity-agency-chief-warns-of-cyberthreats-and-spillovers/
On the occasion of the 2022 pan-European cyber preparedness exercises programme, Cyber Europe, the executive director of the EU agency for cybersecurity (ENISA) warned that states must remain alert for cyber incidents and potential spillovers. While ENISA already monitored about 300 cyber events in relation to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, apart from the Viasat attack, no incidents with a major impact have been reported to date. “However, 100 of these events were spillover incidents, meaning they affected other countries as well, ”
Juhan Lepassaar, ENISA’s executive director, said in a press briefing on Wednesday (8 June).
Tomi Engdahl says:
”Venäjän Google” poisti Ukrainan rajat karttapalvelusta
Venäjän Googleksikin kutsuttu Yandex on tehnyt muutoksia karttapalveluunsa.
https://www.iltalehti.fi/digiuutiset/a/f1abf686-6e13-41ba-a812-fa59232e8200
Yandex on alkanut häivyttää maiden rajoja Yandex Maps -karttapalvelussaan. Yhtiö itse on kertonut, ette se ”ole korostanut kansallisia rajoja kartoissaan”, TechCrunch uutisoi.
Rajat ovat periaatteessa olemassa, mutta esimerkiksi Ukrainan kohdalla rajat on merkitty samalla tavoin kuin Ukrainan sisäiset alueet. Maiden nimet ovat paikallaan, mutta rajat eivät erotu varsinkaan Ukrainan kohdalla lainkaan.
Oikeaa syytä rajojen poistamiselle ei ole oletetusti kerrottu, mutta Yandexin on arveltu välttävän näin toimimalla Kremlistä tulevaa painetta Venäjän hyökätessä parhaillaan Ukrainaan ja vallatessa sen alueita.
Yandex itse on perustellut muutosta sanomalla, että yhtiö haluaa karttojensa ”suuntautuvan paremmin paikalliseen käyttöön”.
Russian tech giant Yandex removes national borders from Maps app
Natasha Lomas
https://techcrunch.com/2022/06/09/yandex-maps-no-borders/
The reconfiguring of Russia’s digital landscape in the wake of Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine continues to play out at a macro and micro level. Here’s a development on the latter front: Local tech giant Yandex has quietly removed national borders from its maps product.
Users of Yandex’s maps app, which is popular in countries in the CIS region, can still see country names displayed — but lines depicting exact borders between countries like Ukraine and Russia are no longer visible.
We understand the move is an attempt to sidestep political pressure from the Kremlin related to the war in Ukraine — where Putin’s regime is attempting to redraw physical borders through bloody, military aggression.
In recent months the Russian tech giant announced a more major reconfiguration of its business aimed at shrinking its political risk
Tomi Engdahl says:
https://hackaday.com/2022/06/12/hackaday-links-june-12-2022/
Also in space telescope news, Russia is apparently trying to hack a shut-down telescope back into operation. This is according to their bombastic space chief, Dmitry Rogozin, who said that he has issued instructions to Roscosmos to reactivate the German eROSITA X-ray telescope aboard the Russia-built and awesomely named Spektr-RG spacecraft. The Germans put the instrument into safe mode back in February, after it had completed only half of the full-sky surveys planned for it, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Officials at the Max Planck Institute, where eROSITA was designed and built, aren’t too thrilled with the attempted takeover, fearing that the instrument might be damaged in the process.
Russia seeks to hijack German telescope on its X-ray spacecraft
“Russian specialists insist on continuing its work.”
https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/06/russia-and-germany-are-fighting-over-an-x-ray-telescope-in-space/
Launched in 2019 on a Proton rocket, the Spektrum-Röntgen-Gamma telescope is arguably the most significant space science mission built and flown by Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago.
The 1.2-ton Spektr-RG spacecraft, located about 1.5 million km from Earth in a halo orbit, is an advanced X-ray observatory designed to detect and map galaxy clusters as well as supermassive black holes. The concept for the spacecraft originated during the Soviet Union, but like a lot of major space projects, it was set aside during the USSR’s collapse.
The Russian space corporation, Roscosmos, eventually picked up the idea and partnered with the German space agency, DLR, on the mission. Under the plan, Russia would build the Spektr-RG spacecraft and launch it, whereas the Germany-based Max Planck Institute for Extraterrestrial Physics would design and build the primary instrument on board, named eROSITA. This instrument took its first observations in late 2019 and was intended to conduct a seven-year survey.
Everything went well until Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine earlier this year. As part of the Western response to that aggression, Germany took the step of halting its cooperation with Russia on the Spektr-RG telescope. At the time, eROSITA had completed four of eight “all-sky” surveys and was put into safe mode.
But now, the chief of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, said it is time to turn eROSITA back on. Deutsche Welle reports that Rogozin made the following remarks during a Russian television program:
I gave instructions to start work on restoring the operation of the German telescope in the Spektr-RG system so it works together with the Russian telescope. Despite Germany’s demand to shut down one of the two telescopes at Spektr-RG, Russian specialists insist on continuing its work. Roscosmos will make relevant decisions in the near future. They—the people that made the decision to shut down the telescope—don’t have a moral right to halt this research for humankind just because their pro-fascist views are close to our enemies.
German officials said that restarting the scientific instrument without their cooperation could cause damage to the telescope.
The move represents another destructive act by Rogozin, who has been a prominent supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. Sources have suggested to Ars that Rogozin’s actions are calculated to curry favor with Putin, and he has been willing to sacrifice cooperation in space to look “strong” to his boss.
Tomi Engdahl says:
Russian hackers start targeting Ukraine with Follina exploits https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-hackers-start-targeting-ukraine-with-follina-exploits/
Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is warning that the Russian hacking group Sandworm may be exploiting Follina, a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) currently tracked as CVE-2022-30190.